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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a reform for nonprofit exemption and
unrelated business income tax. Current tax law provides unclear
guidance and requires exempt organizations to risk their entire
exemptions on this guidance, leading them to make the socially
inefficient choice to use for-profit subsidiaries to preserve their
exemptions. Reforming the tax law will solve this inefficiency while
providing exempt nonprofits with the desirable option to undertake
efficient nonexempt activities to augment their operating budgets.
This reform is particularly timely in light of changes to the
healthcare field; reform will enable exempt healthcare organizations
to offset rising health costs and decreased reimbursements with other
revenue opportunities.
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INTRODUCTION
Healthcare costs have risen significantly over the past several years.
Health expenditures per capita have increased by more than five
thousand percent from 1960 to 2008.1 Government support of exempt
activity2 and private donations3 have dropped. Yet exempt healthcare
1. See National Health Expenditures Aggregate, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf (last visited May 25, 2011). National
expenditures have risen from $147 per capita in 1960 to $7,845 per capita in 2008. Id.
Amounts are adjusted to current dollars. Id.
2. See MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 1-2, 5 (3d ed. 2007).
3. See id. at 1-2; see also Shelly Banjo, Donations Slip Amid Anxiety, WALL ST.
J., June 9, 2010, at A2 (documenting decreases in support of nonprofits). Private
charitable giving fell in 2008 and again in 2009. Id. at A2. Until 2008, charitable giving
had fallen only once since 1956. Id.
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organizations are frustrated by an unclear IRS tax policy that often leads
to a high-stakes gamble when they attempt to offset price increases with
profitable activity. Other exempt organizations are also faced with the
same problem, and are similarly dissuaded from engaging in nonexempt
activity that might raise revenue to counter the diminished government
and private support.
Tax law, which threatens to revoke exemptions if organizations
undertake too much nonexempt activity, places an extremely high
penalty on excessive for-profit activity that, when combined with murky
tax guidance, drives exempt organizations to use inefficient for-profit
subsidiaries instead of conducting activities directly. Unfortunately,
there is little coherent policy that justifies these tax policies; instead,
their vestigial existence apparently stems from historical events. These
events do not justify the continuation of the current system in light of its
costs.
The general decision to choose the nonprofit or for-profit
organizational form is a topic that has received considerable attention.
Whether an organization should incorporate as a nonprofit depends on
numerous factors, such as how it will be affected by the non-distribution
constraint (the essence of a nonprofit corporation, which is prohibited
from distributing profits);4 whether it would qualify for federal tax
exemption (not all nonprofits are exempt);5 and the public’s perception
of the value added by being a nonprofit (the simple fact of being a
nonprofit may elevate the organization in the public eye).6 What has

4. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Am. Auto. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 1146 (1953) (holding that the
nonprofit automobile service club - the American Automobile Association - cannot
obtain an exemption); see also Hansmann, supra note 4, at 881, 883 (observing that the
nonprofit form dominates among automobile clubs, despite generally not receiving
exempt treatment). It has been estimated that a significant portion of nonprofits are not
exempt. See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 21-22
(1992).
6. See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY vii (1988) (noting that
some people think certain nonprofits are “safer” than for-profits); see also Hearing on
Gov’t Waste and Tax Abuses by Gov’t and Nonprofit Entities Before the Subcomm. on
Procurement, Taxation and Tourism of the H. Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong. 1
(1994) (statement of Rep. James D. Santini, Chairman, Business Coalition for Fair
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been less noted is that even if an organization chooses the nonprofit
form, it must still make the same nonprofit/for-profit assessment for
many of its activities, which could be performed by the nonprofit parent
or placed in a nonprofit or for-profit subsidiary. Nonprofits have been
increasingly utilizing for-profit subsidiaries.7 While the justification for
the for-profit subsidiary choice is clear in some cases, such as where the
activity is purely for-profit in nature, in other situations, such as joint
ventures between nonprofit hospitals and for-profit organizations, the
decision to use a for-profit subsidiary may be less obvious, as well as
less desirable from an economic efficiency perspective.
Why then are nonprofits making these choices? Tax guidance for
situations when for-profit activities threaten a nonprofit’s exemption is
vague, and the stakes are high. A nonprofit may only engage in a certain
amount of nonexempt taxable behavior before losing its exemption,8 and
how much is too much is determined by the IRS on an unpredictable
case-by-case basis.9 In some circumstances, therefore, a nonprofit may
place activities that include both for-profit and nonprofit aspects into a
for-profit subsidiary, even when those activities could be better
performed by the nonprofit directly, in order to ensure that the nonprofit
parent’s exemption remains safe.10
Such behavior is undesirable and socially inefficient, yet it is
rational in light of the applicable tax guidance. This Article therefore
suggests several reforms to the nonprofit exemption requirements and
the Unrelated Business Income Tax (“UBIT”) that preserve their
purposes while providing nonprofits the flexibility to allocate activities
efficiently among nonprofit and for-profit forms. Although some lack of
clarity in tax guidance is inevitable, reducing the risks posed by the
unpredictability of the current process would eliminate much of the
Competition), reprinted in 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, 117-25 (June 17, 1994) (noting the
“halo advantage” nonprofits possess when dealing with the public).
7. See, e.g., James J. McGovern, The Use of Taxable Subsidiary Corporations by
Public Charities – A Tax Policy Issue for 1988, 38 TAX NOTES 1125, 1128 (1988)
(noting nonprofits’ increased use of for-profit subsidiaries beginning in the 1980s).
8. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Jessica Peña & Alexander L.T. Reid, Note, A Call for Reform of the
Operational Test for Unrelated Commercial Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1855, 1875 (2001).
10. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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undesirable incentives pushing nonprofits to adopt the inefficient forprofit subsidiary form.
The nonprofit sector accounts for a considerable portion of U.S.
economic activity. Nonprofit revenue constitutes 11 to 12 percent of
GDP and about 9 percent of employment, with assets well over $2
trillion.11 Given the size and importance of nonprofit operations, it is
desirable to give them the proper organizational incentives.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces traditional
justifications for choosing the nonprofit corporate form. This discussion
will be used later in the Article when analyzing how to modify
requirements for exemption and the UBIT. Parts II and III then review
the current state of federal tax exemption laws and the UBIT,
respectively, showing the high stakes and uncertainty that nonprofits
face when predicting how activities with for-profit components will
affect their exemption. Part IV examines how nonprofits currently use
for-profit subsidiaries in response to this uncertainty, coupled with the
high stakes of risking the overall exemption. For-profit subsidiaries are
used in three general ways, two of which are socially efficient and one
of which is socially inefficient. Part V suggests a reform for nonprofit
exemption requirements and the UBIT that eliminates the sociallyinefficient use of for-profit subsidiaries, making tax law more neutral
with respect to organizational choice. Finally, this Article concludes
with an Appendix containing additional information and analysis
regarding IRS data and methodologies accompanying the figures
throughout the Article.
Although the focus in this Article is on generating efficient
incentives for nonprofits, society and nonprofits likely care about other
goals as well, such as fulfilling their charitable missions or promoting
distributive justice.12 Nevertheless, to the extent we can maximize
11. Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller
General, U.S. Government Accountability Office); Statistics of Income Tax Stats –
Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.
gov/taxstats/charitablestats/article/0,,id=97176,00.html (last visited May 25, 2011).
12. See generally Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax
Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U.L. REV. 505 (2010) (arguing
that distributive justice issues play an important role in justifying the current system of
exemptions).
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efficiency without compromising these other goals, we should do so.
Such is the objective throughout this Article.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NONPROFIT FORM
Economic and policy justifications for the nonprofit corporate form
have spanned a number of dimensions. Two compelling and
complementary explanations in particular have emerged. Some argue
that nonprofits fill a role of providing public goods at an efficient level –
a level that neither the government nor private firms would match.13
Others claim that nonprofits solve an asymmetric information problem –
consumers find it difficult to monitor the quality of certain goods and
services, and nonprofits are able to solve this situation through their
non-distribution constraint.14 This information asymmetry commonly
emerges in public good financing through donations, as well as in other
situations.
A. PUBLIC GOODS THEORY
Public goods are those that are nonrival and nonexcludable.15 This
means that consumption of the good by one person does not preclude
simultaneous consumption of the good at the same level by others, and
people cannot easily be excluded from consuming the good.16 A
prototypical example of a public good is a streetlamp on an open road.
The amount of light on the street is not diminished by the passage of
pedestrians, and pedestrians cannot easily be excluded from enjoying the
light on the street without excluding them from the street altogether.
Because of the nonrivalrous and nonexcludable nature of public
goods, the private market will supply them at an inefficiently low level.
Once the good is provided, all individuals can consume it regardless of
their contribution to the good. Thus, Consumer A can conceal his own
demand for the good and wait for someone else to purchase it. Then, A
can free-ride on the purchase and consume the good without paying for
13.
(1977).
14.
15.
16.

See, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 51-76
See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 843-45.
See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 359 (1995).
See id.
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it. These incentives result in an inefficiently low observable demand for
the good (in terms of who is willing to pay for it), and hence a socially
suboptimal under-provision of the good.17
Provision of public goods by the government, instead of by private
actors, is often proposed as a solution to this situation. However, if
demand for the public good by individuals is non-uniform at a given
price, then public choice theory predicts that the government will
underprovide these public goods as well.18 Suppose that the public good
costs P per unit of output provided. Then, assuming that the government
requires each individual to pay a percentage p of this P,19 each
individual's level of the quantity demanded, at the associated price p x P,
is arranged from least to greatest. The rational politician would provide
only the median individual’s quantity demanded. By doing so, this
median individual and those demanding less of the public good are
satisfied, securing the politician majority approval.20
However, those individuals who demand more of the public good
than is provided by the government have residual unsatisfied demand.
These individuals could resort to the private market, but under the public
goods theory private goods are thought to be an imperfect substitute, not
providing as much social benefit per unit as the public good.21 Instead,
pP.

17. The analysis is similar for public goods that can be provided in varying
degrees, rather than either provided or not provided. See, e.g., 5 JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN: THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC
GOODS 12-15 (1999) (analyzing the demand and supply of public goods).
18. See, e.g., WEISBROD, supra note 13.
19. Id. at 54. Because of progressive tax rates, this uniform p across all consumers
is unlikely. However, the analysis still works even if individuals are assumed to pay
differing shares of P. Individuals only need to be able to determine their personal
quantity demanded of public goods at a given price.
20. Alternative assumptions might imply that the politician would provide other
amounts of the good. For instance, if individuals’ intensity of demand were taken into
account, the amount provided by the politician might change. See id. at 54-55. The
intuition of the model works, however, as long as the politician does not provide the
quantity demanded by the individual who wants the most provided, or, equivalently,
that there is some residual demand left unsatisfied by the political process. Practically,
such an outcome seems very likely.
21. See id. at 58-59; see also supra text accompanying note 17. But see Hansmann
supra note 4, at 849 n.46 (questioning whether such a distinction between public and
private goods exists).
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nonprofits arise to meet this demand by providing additional quantities
of the public good. However, because the nonprofit solution may suffer
from financing difficulties inherent in public good provision including
consumers’ ability to free-ride,22 partial subsidies are provided through
methods including tax exemptions and deductibility of donations to
these organizations.23 Left unanswered is the question of why the
nonprofit form and its accompanying non-distribution constraint is the
requisite form for public good provision. The following theory addresses
this point.
B. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES THEORY
Information asymmetries emerge when one party to a transaction
possesses information that another party does not. A prototypical
example is observed in the used car market – sellers of used cars have
better information regarding the quality of their cars than do potential
buyers.24 Asymmetries in information can lead to a market breakdown.
In the used car market example, while the sellers know whether the
quality of their car is high or low, the buyers do not have that
information and will therefore offer a price based on the assumption that
the car could be of either low or high quality. The price at which the
buyers are willing to buy falls below a high quality car’s worth because
it takes into account the probability that the car is of lower quality.
Sellers of high quality cars will thus refuse to sell their product at this
low price. Eventually, only sellers of lower quality cars will remain on
the market. The buyers, knowing this, will update the probability that a
car is of low quality and drop their price further. This process repeats
recursively until only the lowest-quality cars remain in the used car
market. The market for high-quality used cars fails.25
22.
23.
24.

See supra text accompanying note 17.
WEISBROD, supra note 13, at 66-67.
This situation is examined in George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970).
25. See id. Various mechanisms have arisen to counteract this market failure. For
instance, warranties for used cars increase a low quality used car’s worth to at or above
the worth of a high-quality used car, making buyers indifferent to whether they
purchase a high- or low-quality used car. Warranties will cost the seller less if his car is
of high quality than if it is of low quality. A market equilibrium can emerge where all
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Another instance of an information asymmetry occurs when the
purchaser of a good or service cannot easily ascertain the quality of the
good or service. Charitable donations are an example of this situation.
The person who donates money to an organization to relieve poverty in
Africa cannot easily determine whether his donation is actually used for
poverty relief, or whether it is used to line the pockets of the
organization’s managers and directors.26 Professor Henry Hansmann has
argued that nonprofit organizations are an effective method of
addressing these information asymmetries.27
The distinguishing characteristic of a nonprofit corporation, as
compared to a for-profit one, is that nonprofits are prohibited from
distributing net earnings to their controlling members. This
characteristic is referred to as the non-distribution constraint.28 The nondistribution constraint removes managers’ and directors’29 primary
incentive to co-opt the donations in the above charitable donation
hypothetical.30 Instead, managers of nonprofit organizations are left with
sellers of high-quality cars sell with warranties at a high price, and sellers of lowquality cars sell at a high price with a warranty or a low price without a warranty. See
Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure
About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981) (developing this point).
26. This situation stems from the general problem of being unable to write an
enforceable contract to meet the consumer’s (in this case the donor, who is the
consumer of charitable services) specifications. The inability to effectively monitor the
charitable services provider imposes significant costs that create this problem.
27. Hansmann, supra note 4, at 843-45. Hansmann recognized that information
asymmetry could be used to justify the existence of nonprofit corporations generally.
The information asymmetry problem had previously been discussed in the specific
contexts of nonprofit healthcare and daycare organizations. See generally Kenneth J.
Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV.
941 (1963) (healthcare); Richard Nelson & Michael Krashinsky, Two Major Issues of
Public Policy: Public Policy and the Organization of Supply, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR
DAY CARE OF YOUNG CHILDREN 47 (Dennis R. Young & Richard R. Nelson eds., 1973)
(daycare).
28. This definition was formalized in Hansmann, supra note 4, at 838.
29. For simplicity, the remainder of the Article will refer to just managers.
30. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 843-44. Although managers may no longer
have incentives to pocket donations directly, they may still have incentives to spend the
money not in accordance with donors’ interests. For instance, managers may derive
nonpecuniary utility from controlling larger and more prominent corporations and may
therefore spend funding on additional employees in order to increase the corporation’s

484

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

weaker second-order incentives, such as to carry out their charitable
mission, which makes them more likely to act in accordance with
donors’ desires.31 Thus, the non-distribution constraint acts as a
commitment mechanism that responds to the contracting failure.
The non-distribution constraint is a fairly clumsy form of consumer
protection, however. In some respects, the non-distribution constraint
renders the nonprofit form less efficient than for-profit analogues.32
Unlike for-profits, nonprofit firms can use donations as a revenue
source; however, they cannot raise funds through equity and must
instead rely upon debt issuance, retained earnings, and unpredictable
donations as the exclusive methods of revenue financing.33 Lack of
equity financing puts nonprofits at a disadvantage, particularly when
their funding advantage—donations—is insignificant.34
Furthermore, by removing the profit motive, the non-distribution
constraint may lead managers to choose less efficient production
methods than their for-profit counterparts, resulting in provision of
services at a higher price.35 Note, however, that the separation of
size. See Richard Steinberg & Bradford H. Gray, “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise” in
1993: Hansmann Revisited, 22 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 297, 301-02
(1993).
31. See, e.g., John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency
Problems and Legal Strategies, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 43 n.30 (2d ed. 2009) (comparing high-powered monetary incentives
to low-powered ethical or moral incentives).
32. See generally Hansmann, supra note 4, at 877-79 (analyzing the drawbacks of
the non-distribution constraint).
33. Recall that the non-distribution constraint prevents equity owners from sharing
in profits, making equity offerings not feasible.
34. Nonprofits that receive most revenue through donations are termed “donative”
nonprofits. The Red Cross is one example. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 840.
Nonprofits that finance themselves primarily through the sale of goods and services are
“commercial” nonprofits such as hospitals. Some nonprofit organizations, such as
private schools and opera houses, rely on a mixture of donations and the sale of goods
and services. Id. at 840-41.
In addition, nonprofits that do not entitle donors to a tax-deduction may be less
likely to receive significant donation funding. These nonprofits are those that either
attempt to influence legislation to any significant extent, that participate in political
campaigns to any extent, or that do not pursue exemption. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3),
170(c)(2)(D) (2006).
35. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 878.
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ownership and control and the accompanying agency problems in
typical for-profit organization also dampen the profit motive’s influence
on for-profit managers’ efficiency.36 Accordingly, there is mixed
evidence regarding whether nonprofit organizations are run less
efficiently than their for-profit counterparts.37
Because of the clumsiness of the non-distribution constraint as a
consumer protection device, it is not surprising that the nonprofit form is
the efficient organizational choice only when the need for consumer
protection is particularly great.38 Economic efficiency is not the only
driving force of organizational choice, however. 39 Tax law affects this
36.
37.

Id.
Some studies suggest that for-profit hospitals are more efficient than nonprofit
ones. See, e.g., Carson W. Bays, Cost Comparisons of Forprofit and Nonprofit
Hospitals, 13 SOC. SCI. & MED. 219 (1979); Kenneth W. Clarkson, Some Implications
of Property Rights in Hospital Management, 15 J.L. & ECON. 363 (1972). Others argue
that nonprofit hospitals operate more efficiently than for-profits. See, e.g., Yasar A.
Ozcan et al., Ownership and Organizational Performance: A Comparison of Technical
Efficiency Across Hospital Types, 30 MED. CARE 781 (1992). See generally Catherine
Plante, The Differentiation Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals: Another Look,
12 RES. IN HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 7, 7-9 (2009) (providing a review of recent
literature); Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau & Stephen H. Linder, Two Decades of
Research Comparing For-Profit and Nonprofit Health Provider Performance in the
United States, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 219 (2003) (surveying empirical studies and finding
nonprofit hospitals are generally found more efficient than for-profits). Some of the
difference in findings could be attributed to the difficulty in choosing an efficiency
measure. For instance, the typical services offered by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals
do not completely overlap, making cross-comparisons more difficult. See Ozcan et al.,
supra note 37 at 781-82. Finally, the typical consumer may be more concerned with
quality of care, rather than with efficiency of operation, although the two may be
connected. In other sectors, for-profit daycare centers have been found to be no more
efficient than nonprofit centers. H. Naci Mocan, Cost Functions, Efficiency, and
Quality in Day Care Centers, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 861 (1997). For-profit nursing
homes were found to be more efficient than nonprofit homes, however. See, e.g., Sajal
Chattopadhyay & Dennis Heffley, Are For-Profit Nursing Homes More Efficient? Data
Envelopment Analysis With a Case-Mix Constraint, 20 E. ECON. J. 171 (1994); John L.
Fizel & Thomas S. Nunnikhoven, Technical Efficiency of For-Profit and Non-Profit
Nursing Homes, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 429 (1992).
38. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 843-45.
39. While these economic efficiency justifications for the nonprofit form are
compelling, they may not provide the entire picture even when ignoring tax
considerations. There are some activities that seem particularly well suited for the non-
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choice, sometimes pushing organizations towards a socially lessefficient form because it is nevertheless efficient from the individual
organization’s perspective.40 A combination of unclear tax law and
significant stakes at risk drive nonprofits to an inefficient use of the forprofit form. Part II begins an examination of current nonprofit tax law
by looking at the requirements for federal tax exemption.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION
Nonprofits must meet specific federal requirements to qualify for
the federal tax exemption.41 Qualifying as a federal tax-exempt
charitable organization brings additional statutory benefits beyond
exemption of earnings,42 including the ability to issue tax-exempt
bonds,43 an exemption from federal minimum wage laws,44 reduced
postal rates45 and tax deductibility of donations46 (although this latter
distribution constraint’s advantages, yet they are not performed by nonprofits. Pet
boarding or pet daycare services are one such example. The justifications for traditional
daycare—that children are neither discriminating consumers nor good sources of
information—apply to pet boarding or daycare. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 865
(discussing the rationale for nonprofit traditional daycare). Pet boarding or daycare
likely has even more severe informational asymmetries, since these operations may not
be as easily observable as traditional daycare; information may not be spread as easily
since pet owners may not form the same tightly-knit social groups that parents do with
playgroups; and mistreatment of pets may be more difficult to detect. Yet this field
appears overwhelmingly composed of for-profit organizations, unlike traditional
daycare which has a significant nonprofit presence. See Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Altruistic Nonprofit Firms in Competitive Markets: The Case of Day-Care Centers in
the United States, 9 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 291, 294 (1986) (estimating that between 45
and 60 percent of daycare providers are nonprofit).
40. See infra Part IV.C.2.
41. I.R.C. §§ 501, 511-13 (2006).
42. These additional benefits are applicable specifically to charitable entities, as
opposed to general exempt entities which receive only exemption of earnings. Compare
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) which defines charitable organizations, with I.R.C. § 501(c) which
provides a general list of exempt organizations. See also infra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text for examples of these additional benefits.
43. See I.R.C. § 145. See generally I.R.S. Publ’n. 4077 (Rev. September 2005)
(IRS compliance guide for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt bonds).
44. See 29 C.F.R. 779.214 (2009) (stating that the Fair Labor Standards Act does
not apply to charitable activities performed by charitable organizations).
45. 39 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1), (e)(1) (2006).
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advantage is unimportant for commercial nonprofits that rely on
commercial activity rather than donations for revenue). States set their
own requirements for additional nonprofit state tax exemption, which
may allow nonprofits to avoid state income taxes,47 sales and use taxes48
and property taxes, 49 depending on the state.50 The states’ rules for
exemption51 generally mirror the federal requirements, although they
may differ in some respects including corporate board structure,52 as
well as certain rights granted to nonprofits.53 Finally, exempt status may
result in other important but unquantifiable benefits, such as an
advantage when dealing with the public,54 or in receiving grants from
private foundations or from state or federal agencies.55
46.
47.

I.R.C. § 170.
See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 209 (McKinney 2008); N.Y. STATE DEP’T. OF
TAXATION AND FIN., FORM CT-247 (2005), available at http://www.tax.state.ny.us/pdf/
2005/fillin/corp/ct247_805_fill_in.pdf (providing exemption from corporate income
tax, known as the franchise tax).
48. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-412(5) (West 2010).
49. See, e.g., CAL. REVENUE & TAXATION CODE § 214 (West 2008).
50. For example, Washington State generally does not allow nonprofits to avoid
business taxes. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-169 (2001).
51. The IRS website provides links to state government websites containing
information
for
tax-exempt
organizations.
State
Links,
IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=129028,00.html (last visited May 25, 2011).
52. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Appendices for Working Paper No. 33.8 - The
Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations, HAUSER CTR. FOR
NONPROFIT ORGS., available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hauser/PDF_XLS/working
papers/workingpaper_33.8%28Appendices%29.pdf (last visited May 25, 2011) (State
Nonprofit Corporation Act Requirements Table).
53. For example, although generally nonprofits cannot distribute their earnings,
some states allow nonprofits to make distributions as long as the distributions are to
other nonprofits. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 5410 (West 2009) (stating that “[n]o
[nonprofit] corporation shall make any distribution”), with OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
65.544(3) (West 2009) (permitting distributions to nonprofit members unless otherwise
provided in articles or bylaws).
54. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
55. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 55 (9th ed.
2007). Private foundation grants to exempt organizations count towards foundation
required distributions and, unlike grants to non-exempt organizations, do not require
oversight by the foundation to ensure they are spent on exempt purposes. Id. at 55, 383.
Further, some federal and state grants and contracts are given only to exempt
organizations. Id. at 55.
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To be exempt from federal taxes, an organization must be both (1)
organized for and (2) operated exclusively for tax-exempt purposes.56
These purposes encompass religious organizations, educational
institutions, and, of particular note, charitable organizations, so long as
(3) net earnings do not inure to the benefit of any private individual.57
Regarding the first element of the exemption requirement, organizations
are treated as “organized” for exempt purposes if their articles of
incorporation restrict activity to one or more exempt purposes and allow
the organization to engage in only insubstantial, if any, activities not in
furtherance of the exempt purpose.58 The third requirement, that benefits
do not inure in whole or in part to private individuals, is met as long as
private individuals either do not benefit from the exempt activities at all,
or benefit as only an incidental feature of performing the exempt
activity.59

56.
57.

See I.R.C. § 501 (2006).
Id. § 501(c)(3). Those who receive private inurement benefits may be subjected
to a tax penalty of 25%; their managers to a 10% tax if they possessed knowledge about
the inurement; and, if the benefit is not returned, the individuals may be subjected to an
additional 200% tax. Id. § 4958. Organizations can also lose their exemption if private
inurement occurs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2008); see
also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff’d, 823 F.2d
1310 (9th Cir. 1987) (revoking the Church of Scientology’s exemption because of
private inurement).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b).
59. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987). Note that private
individuals can receive a reasonable wage for work performed for an exempt
organization, without jeopardizing the exempt status. See, e.g., Mabee Petroleum Corp.
v. United States, 203 F.2d 872, 876 (5th Cir. 1953). Too much compensation can result
in revocation of exemption or significant tax liability. See Founding Church of
Scientology v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 490 (1969) (citing excess compensation as
influencing factor when revoking exemption); 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (imposing tax liability
for excessive compensation). See generally JEAN WRIGHT & JAY H. ROTZ, REASONABLE
COMPENSATION (1993) (IRS Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education
Technical Instruction Program discussing reasonable and excessive compensation).
The IRS has determined that such incidental benefit must be incidental in both
a qualitative and quantitative sense. Id. This requirement means that the benefit “must
be a necessary concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large, i.e., the
activity can be accomplished only by benefiting certain individuals . . . . To be
incidental in a qualitative sense, the private benefit must not be substantial after
considering the overall public benefit conferred by the activity.” Id.
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The second requirement, that the organization be operated
“exclusively” for exempt purposes, is perhaps the most interesting. This
requirement is commonly referred to as the “primary purpose test,”60
and gauges what the organization actually does, rather than what it is
organized to do. While this operational test provides several
restrictions,61 the focus throughout this Article will be on the limitation
on commercial behavior.
The term “exclusively” is not read in its strict sense, but instead has
received a variety of interpretations over time. Initially the term was
read broadly: as long as revenue was used for charitable purposes,
exempt organizations could engage in commercial activity without
risking their exemption.62 Thus commercial activity was treated as
exempt if its revenue was eventually used to promote exempt purposes,
regardless of how this revenue was earned.63
60.
61.

HOPKINS, supra note 55, at 79-80.
These restrictions include purposes that violate public policy as well as
political involvement, including attempts to influence legislation and campaign activity.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (h) (restrictions for influencing legislation or political
campaign activity); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding
exemption revocation on public-policy grounds).
62. An early example of this rule was voiced by the Supreme Court in Trinidad v.
Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). In this case, the Court permitted
the sale of wine and chocolate, as well as substantial investment income as long as the
proceeds were used for exempt purposes, because “[m]aking [exempt] properties
productive to the end that the income may be thus used [for exempt purposes] does not
alter or enlarge the purposes for which the corporation is created and conducted.” Id. at
581.
63. This “destination of income” test was mentioned in Trinidad v. Sagrada. Id. at
581 (noting that the I.R.C. “says nothing about the source of the income, but makes the
destination the ultimate test of exemption.”). The test was later read to exempt a bathing
beach corporation from taxes because the profits were used to fund an exempt
foundation. See Roche’s Beach, Inc. v. Comm’r, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938). Soon after,
a celebrated case involved the exempt New York University Law School, which
purchased a commercial noodle factory for $3.5 million and treated the company’s
revenue as exempt because it was used to support the school’s exempt purposes. C.F.
Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’g 14 T.C. 922 (1950).
Although New York University’s purchase of the noodle company was prominent, it
was hardly the only transaction of this form undertaken by the school. During the same
period, it also operated as exempt organizations Howes Leather (leather products),
American Limoges China (chinaware) and the Ramsey Corporation (piston ring
manufacturing), valued at $35 million, $3.3 million and $3 million, respectively.
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Congress responded to allegations of unfair business competition
stemming from this operation of exempt commercial businesses with the
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) in 1950, which sought to tax
commercial activity unrelated to exempt purposes and thereby place forprofits and exempt nonprofits on equal footing.64 Substantial income
derived from commercial activity unrelated to exempt purposes was no
longer exempt from taxation, even if the income was used exclusively to
further charitable purposes.65
Notably, even after the passage of the UBIT, the “operated
exclusively for exempt purposes” primary purpose requirement remains
as a condition for tax-exempt status today.66 The UBIT applies only if
the organization is already exempt; thus, an organization must first
satisfy the primary purpose test before considerations as to whether its
unrelated activity will be taxed are examined.67 As already mentioned,
“exclusive” has never been interpreted as its strict plain meaning
implies.68 Instead, under current law, activities do not threaten
exemption if they are in furtherance of the exempt purposes, or if they

Revenue Revision of 1950: Hearings Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st Cong.
799 (1950) (statement of Solomon Barkin). New York University was not the only
exempt educational organization to engage in this type of activity, either. For instance,
Union College operated as exempt organizations Abraham & Strauss (department
stores) and Allied Stores (department stores), valued at $9 million and $16.5 million
respectively, and several other exempt organizations operated similar commercial
businesses exempt from tax. Id. at 799-801. See generally Benjamin Fine, University
Dollars Yielding Tax-Free Business Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1948, at A1
(discussing similar activities undertaken by various educational institutions).
64. The UBIT is codified at I.R.C. § 512 (2010). The 1950 House Ways and Means
Committee report on the UBIT noted the problem of unfair competition: “The tax-free
status of these section 101 [now 501] organizations enables them to use their profits
tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits
remaining after taxes.” H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 36 (1950). For a complete analysis of
the factors leading to the UBIT, see Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line:
Uncovering the History and Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax,
54 EMORY L.J. 1475 (2005).
65. See I.R.C. §§ 502, 511-14 (2006).
66. See id. § 501(c)(3).
67. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE TAX LAW OF UNRELATED BUSINESS FOR NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 18-19 (2005).
68. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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are insubstantial;69 but, a single nonexempt purpose or activity, if
substantial enough, may be sufficient to lose exemption.70
A. ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EXEMPT PURPOSES
An organization can conduct as much activity as it wishes without
risking revocation of its exemption so long as the activity is related to
the organization’s exempt purposes.71 An activity can even be
nonexempt itself, without threatening the organization’s exempt
purposes; it need only be related to the organization’s exempt
purposes.72
The IRS does not offer much guidance regarding what activities
qualify as being related to exempt purposes. This lack of direction is
troubling, given that an organization’s exemption hinges on this
determination.73 Much of the interpretation occurs in the context of the
UBIT, which harbors an exemption for activities that are “substantially
related” to exempt purposes.74 However, a comparison of the statutory
requirements for exemption75 and for UBIT76 suggests that only a subset
of the activities that meet the exemption’s “related” requirement, also
satisfy the UBIT’s “substantially related” safe harbor test. Nevertheless,
because much of this analysis occurs in the UBIT context, and because
the IRS requirements for exemption and UBIT relatedness may be

69. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c), (e) (as amended in 2008).
70. See, e.g., Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e). The tax court has made this point explicitly:
The fact that [an organization’s] activity may constitute a trade or business does not,
of itself, disqualify it from [exempt] classification . . . , provided the activity furthers
or accomplishes an exempt purpose. Rather, the critical inquiry is whether [the
organization’s] primary purpose for engaging in its . . . activity is an exempt purpose,
or whether its primary purpose is the nonexempt one of operating a commercial
business producing net profits for [the organization].

B.S.W. Grp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978) (citations omitted).
73. If a nonprofit engages in too much activity unrelated to exempt purposes, it will
no longer be “operated exclusively for exempt purposes” and will lose its I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) exemption. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
74. See I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006).
75. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
76. See I.R.C. § 513(a).
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conflated in practice,77 discussion of this issue will be reserved until
consideration of the UBIT in Part III. At this point it will be noted that
merely determining when an activity is related (either substantially or
otherwise) to exempt purposes is often a difficult process with a great
deal of uncertainty.
B. INSUBSTANTIALITY DETERMINATION
Even when an organization can determine that an activity is not
related to exempt purposes (and is therefore nonexempt), it must still
decide whether the activity is substantial or insubstantial. Substantial
unrelated activities will cause the organization to lose its exemption on
all activities and therefore be subjected to taxation on all its operations,78
while insubstantial activities can be conducted without risking exempt
status.79
Unfortunately, as is the case with an activity’s “relatedness,” the
guidance for determining a nonexempt activity’s substantiality is
unclear. The line between substantiality and insubstantiality has
sometimes been determined by examining the portion of expenditures or
time devoted to the activities.80 For example, exemption has been denied
when as little as one third of revenues were derived from a nonexempt
business.81 However, although a simple ratio of nonexempt to exempt
activities would provide a clear rule, the IRS has not followed such a
path; exemption has been upheld in other cases even when the ratio of
revenue from nonexempt to exempt activities has significantly exceeded
one third,82 and the IRS has noted that there is no “quantitative
limitation” that governs this ratio.83
77. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 55, at 721 (noting that exemption and the UBIT
share versions of the primary purpose test); Peña & Reid, supra note 9, at 1865; see
also infra note 101.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
80. See HOPKINS, supra note 55, at 721-22.
81. See Orange Cnty. Agric. Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 893 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1990)
(upholding revocation of taxpayer’s exemption on two independent grounds, one of
which was substantial unrelated income).
82. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-11-003 (Nov. 8, 1995) (upholding exemption
for organization that derived over 98% of its gross revenue from unrelated activities,
spending 50 percent of its time on these activities); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-21-056
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It would appear that although relative activity may be relevant, a
determination of exempt status ultimately requires an individual inquiry
into the particular facts84 with such indicators as the extent and existence
of competition with commercial firms, use of promotional materials,
amount of advertising, and plans to solicit from donors all informative
pieces that will be used to render a decision.85
C. WHAT IS AT STAKE
While relatedness and substantiality have developed as somewhat
nebulous concepts, what is at stake is the very well defined exemption.
If activities are too substantial, and are not charitable in their own right
or are not sufficiently related to something that is, the organization loses
its exemption on all activities, not merely those in question.86 This loss
can be incredibly devastating. Consider for example Harvard College,
which claims almost $2 billion in annual income from charitable
activities and tax-deductible donations.87 A blanket exemption loss
would drastically impact its operations.

(Feb. 8, 2000) (upholding exemption for organization that obtained 66% of its revenue
from unrelated activities).
83. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-21-056 (Feb. 8, 2000).
84. See, e.g., B.S.W. Grp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 358 (1978); Nationalist
Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 589 (1994), aff’d, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted).
85. See Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted). An early case to employ such a facts-and-circumstances approach
looked at similar indicators. See B.S.W. Grp., 70 T.C. at 358-60 (citations omitted)
(listing as relevant whether prices are set at or near cost instead of below cost; the
failure to show lack of competition with for-profit organizations; and that revenue
overwhelmingly came from commercial operations). None of these factors is
dispositive. Id.
86. See Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), (e) (as amended in 2008).
87. Harvard’s exempt charitable revenue totaled $1,209,148,774 and its donations
(excluding government grants) totaled $648,555,198 in 2010. See Harvard’s Form 990,
GUIDESTAR.ORG, Part VIII, http://www2.guidestar.org/ReportNonProfit.aspx?ein=042103580 (last visited May 25, 2011). These figures are for Harvard College only, and
do not include additional tax benefits it may receive through related organizations. Id.
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D. SUMMARY
Determination of whether an unrelated activity is substantial in
nature is often as inexact as determining whether the activity is
unrelated in the first place, making predictability difficult.88 As the Tax
Court has noted, “[n]either the Internal Revenue Code, the regulations,
nor the case law provides [sic] a general definition of ‘insubstantial’ for
purposes of section 501(c)(3),” 89 and an erratic fact-specific inquiry has
arisen to provide interpretation.90 Although organizations can achieve
tax guidance from the IRS in the form of a public letter ruling, this
process is often impractical due to both its slowness91 and its cost.92 If
what was risked by this uncertainty were small, then the lack of
predictability would not be troubling; however, because an
organization’s entire exemption is on the line, this unpredictability is
intolerable, driving the use of inefficient, but predictable, for-profit
subsidiaries. Before examining this issue further, the UBIT and its
overlap with the exemption requirements must be explored.
III. THE UBIT
Having determined that an exempt organization’s unrelated
activities are not substantial enough to revoke its exemption, the next
step is to see whether UBIT applies. The overlap between activities that
risk exemption (depending on their substantiality) and activities that are
subjected to the UBIT is significant but not complete. The UBIT applies
88. See John D. Colombo, Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on
Commercial Activity by Charities, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 667, 672-79 (2007) (providing
a thorough history of IRS interpretation of substantiality and coming to a similar
conclusion regarding the unpredictability of when an unrelated activity will be deemed
substantial).
89. Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 710 (1990) (as corrected Sept.
25, 1990).
90. See, e.g., Peña & Reid, supra note 9, at 1867-68; supra notes 84-85 and
accompanying text.
91. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Hedging the IRS – A Policy Justification for Excluding
Liability and Insurance Proceeds, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4, 7-8 (2009) (discussing how
this impracticability has led to a rise in “tax insurance”).
92. The current cost for exempt organization private letter rulings is $10,000 per
ruling for most rulings. Rev. Proc. 2010-8, 2010-1 I.R.B. 234.
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to “gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade
or business . . . regularly carried on by it,” 93 subject to certain clear
statutory exclusions. Thus, the two tests for UBIT applicability to a nonexcluded activity are whether the activity is an unrelated trade or
business, and whether the activity is regularly carried on.94 Both tests
must be satisfied before the activity will be subjected to the UBIT.95
A. UNRELATED TRADE OR BUSINESS
The unrelated trade or business prong, consisting of both an
“unrelated” component and a “trade or business” component, is
designed to encompass any income-producing activities that do not
further exempt purposes.96 “Trade or business” is defined
straightforwardly as “any activity carried on for the production of
income from the sale of goods or performance of services.”97
“Unrelated” is not as clear a concept. The IRS has propounded a
requirement for UBIT unrelatedness similar to that used when
determining whether activities are unrelated for exemption purposes.98
In the exemption context, activities are either “related” to exempt
purposes (hence not jeopardizing exemption) or unrelated; in the UBIT
context, activities are either “substantially related” to exempt purposes
(hence avoiding imposition of the UBIT) or not.99 Thus, to the extent
“related” and “substantially related” are treated as different concepts,100
discussion of unrelated activities in the UBIT context should include all
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

I.R.C. § 512 (2006).
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983). The Supreme Court initially
viewed the concept of trade or business narrowly, “fall[ing] far short of reaching every
income or profit making activity.” Whipple v. Comm’r, 373 U.S. 193, 201 (1963); see
also John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt Organizations: A Study of Their
Nature and the Applicability of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 AKRON TAX J.
223, 249 (1996) (making the same observation). The concept has been broadened since
then. Id. at 249.
98. See supra Part II.A for discussion of unrelatedness in the exemption context.
99. See I.R.C. § 513 (2006).
100. Treasury Regulations suggest that such a distinction should be drawn, although
in practice it may not be. See, e.g., infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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activities that are also unrelated in the exemption context, and
substantially related activities in the UBIT context should also be related
in the exemption context.101 The following diagram may help in
explaining this point.102 Despite the difference in language, however, the
two terms are often treated interchangeably.103

101. Theoretically, if the IRS respects the difference between “substantially related”
and merely “related,” then there could be some activities that are unrelated in the UBIT
context that are related in the exemption context, or, equivalently, the “substantially
related” requirement in the UBIT context could not include all “related” activities in the
exemption context. Such activities would be related to exempt purposes, but not related
enough to be deemed “substantially” related. There is no evidence in the 1950
Congressional Record, however, to indicate that such a difference was recognized or
intended during the drafting of the UBIT, and the two concepts are often conflated
today. For example, immediately following an informative opening statement by the
Internal Revenue Commissioner explaining implementation of the UBIT in a House
hearing on the UBIT, the Chairman of the Committee noted that “there is a very unclear
gray line between unrelated or related business activity.” Unrelated Business Income
Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 100th Cong. 70 (1987) (statement of Chairman J.J. Pickle) [hereinafter UBIT
Hearings]. The distinction that should have been drawn is between unrelated and
substantially related activity. Chairman Pickle previously drew this correct distinction.
Id. at 9 (noting that the UBIT is “a tax paid on income that is not substantially related to
an organization’s tax-exempt purpose.”).
102. The Treasury Regulations make clear that we should consider the primary
definition of substantially—“[i]n substance; in one’s or its substantial nature or
existence; as a substantial thing or being”—as opposed to its very different secondary
definition of “essentially, intrinsically.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
(defining substantially); see Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983).
103. See supra note 101.

2012]

REFORMING NONPROFIT
EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS

497

The determination of what is substantially related to exempt
purposes is largely made on a case-by-case basis. Some bright line rules
have been drawn, although they are a long way from providing guidance
on all transactions. Activities for which the sole purpose is to provide
revenue for exempt purposes are not on that basis related, substantially
or otherwise, to exempt purposes.104 Moving into more nebulous
territory, an activity is substantially related if a substantial causal
relationship exists between the activity and the achievement of the
exempt purpose.105 In an attempt to elucidate, the Treasury has clarified
that for a commercial activity to be substantially related to exempt
purposes, it must “contribute importantly to the accomplishment of
those [exempt] purposes”106 and go beyond merely earning profits to be
used for an exempt purpose. The predictive power of this guidance is
unfortunately quite limited, leaving exempt organizations often guessing
which commercial activities will be found substantially related to
exempt purposes.107 For example, sales from a museum-owned
restaurant satisfy the “substantially related” requirement if made to
employees or patrons,108 but not if made to non-patrons.109 Revenue
from an exempt hospital-operated pharmacy is substantially related to
the extent the pharmacy supplies pharmaceuticals to hospital patients,110
but not when the pharmacy supplies pharmaceuticals to non-hospital
patients of private doctors leasing space within the hospital.111 The sale
of blazer buttons adapted from a medal commemorating George
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (as amended in 1975).
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983).
Id.
See, e.g., Roger P. Meyers, Risky Ventures: The Impact of IRS Health Care
Joint Venture Policy, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 481, 506-07 (2009).
108. See Rev. Rul. 74-399, 1974-2 C.B. 172. The exemption is justified under the
theory that making food available on-premises gives patrons more time to view the
exhibits and makes the museum staff more efficient. Id.
109. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-00-002 (May 16, 1997). While the portion of
sales to museum patrons and staff would be substantially related to the museum’s
exempt purpose, sales to the general public that did not visit or pay admission to the
museum were deemed unrelated. See id.
110. See Carle Found. v. United States, No. 75-2-148, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18671, at *8-9 (E.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1978).
111. See Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1979).
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Washington’s inauguration is taxable, unless the buttons are
accompanied by descriptive literature regarding their historical
significance.112
Activities substantially related to exempt purposes can emerge in
unexpected ways despite their seemingly-unrelated or commercial
nature.113 For instance, income from a hospital cafeteria is substantially
related to the hospital’s exempt purpose because it improves the
physical comfort and well-being of its patients, while enhancing
efficiency by keeping hospital staff on the premises.114 A halfway
house’s furniture workshop is deemed substantially related to the
house’s exempt purposes, because the shop “affords the residents
gainful employment and enables them to develop the ability to cope
with emotional problems.”115 A museum gift shop’s revenue
substantially relates to the museum’s exempt purpose to the extent the
items it sells “enhance[s] the public’s understanding or appreciation of
[the museum’s field].”116 The sizable revenue from school athletic
programs is exempt under the theory that these programs further the
schools’ educational purposes.117
On the other hand, other activities that might seem substantially
related to exempt purposes have been deemed not to be. Some museum
gift shop items are not exempt, while others are, and the line between
them is determined by the primary purpose of the sale, a standard that
often is not particularly clear.118 For example, the sale by a museum gift

112. UBIT Hearings, supra note 101, at 68 (statement by Lawrence B. Gibbs,
Comm’r, IRS).
113. The following example, as well as additional ones, are listed in J. Patrick
Plunkett & Heidi Neff Christianson, The Quest for Cash: Exempt Organizations, Joint
Ventures, Taxable Subsidiaries, and Unrelated Business Income, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1, 9-10 (2004).
114. Rev. Rul. 69-268, 1969-1 C.B. 160. No mention is made of the treatment of
any sales to non-employee, non-patient visitors who make purchases for themselves
only, although presumably this revenue would not be substantially related to the
hospital’s exempt purpose. See supra note 109.
115. Rev. Rul. 75-472, 1975-2 C.B. 208.
116. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-22-030 (Mar. 4, 2002).
117. See John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax-Exemption, and College Athletics, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 132 (examining this exemption in detail).
118. E.g., supra note 116. The Treasury Ruling states that:
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shop of a metal pencil box shaped like a mummy is related to the
museum’s exempt purpose, while the sale of chocolate mummies is
not.119 Drawing these distinctions without the benefit of an individuallytailored IRS ruling is a difficult process.
While some guidance exists about whether an activity will be
deemed substantially related to exempt purposes or will instead be taxed
as ordinary income, many activities fall within a gray area of uncertainty
regarding how they would be classified. This classification effects an
activity’s profitability due to imposition of a corporate tax on
nonexempt activities,120 and can therefore sway the decision of whether
the activity will be undertaken.
B. REGULARLY CARRIED ON
An activity must also meet the criterion of being “regularly carried
on” before it will be subjected to the UBIT.121 Because one of the
UBIT’s original goals was to promote similar tax treatment among forprofit and exempt firms,122 the UBIT applies only when an exempt firm
engages in commercial activity like a for-profit would.123 On this basis,

[w]here the primary purpose behind the production and sale of the item is utilitarian,
ornamental, a souvenir in nature, or only generally educational in nature, it should not
be considered substantially related within the meaning of section 513(a) of the Code.
However, where the primary purpose behind the production and sale of the item is to
further the organization’s exempt purpose, the sale is related, and income earned from
that sale is exempt.

Id.
119. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-20-002 (Nov. 26, 1996). Note that this
distinction meets neither the substantially related nor substantially unrelated conditions
set forth above. See supra note 118. To reach this classification, the IRS adopted the
additional requirement that exempt items have “sufficient permanence.” See I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-20-002.
120. The marginal federal corporate tax rate at the highest bracket is currently 35%.
I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D) (2006). States generally impose their own additional corporate
taxes as well. For example, Iowa’s marginal corporate tax rate at the highest bracket is
currently 12%. IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.33(1)(d) (West 2009). A table of state corporate
tax rates can be obtained at http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/230.html (last
visited March 18, 2012).
121. See I.R.C. § 512.
122. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c) (as amended in 1983).
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intermittent activity unrelated to exempt purposes will still be excluded
from UBIT if the nonprofit does not employ the same competitive and
promotional efforts used by for-profit organizations, or if the activity is
very infrequent, such as an annual fund-raiser.124 Other intermittent
behavior may be more difficult to classify; an activity that is typically
undertaken year-round by for-profit firms can be subjected to the UBIT
if engaged in by a nonprofit only once per week, but not if engaged in
for a one-time, two-week consecutive period.125
Practically, most activities of commercial significance will satisfy
the regularity requirement,126 making its ambiguity less troubling than
some of the previously-discussed factors for exemption or applicability
of the UBIT. Nevertheless, it is not immediately clear why the UBIT
should not apply to all unrelated activities, whether or not regularly
carried on. This Article will reserve discussion of UBIT reform until
Part V when analyzing how changes to the UBIT coupled with
modification of initial exemption requirements would provide
organizations with clearer guidance, while promoting societal
efficiency.
C. STATUTORILY EXCLUDED ACTIVITIES
In addition to activities that are either substantially related to
exempt purposes or not regularly carried on, a variety of additional
activities or income are statutorily excluded from income tax.127 These
include passive investment income (dividends, interest payments,
annuities);128 gain on property disposition;129 royalties;130 rents from real
or personal property;131 work performed substantially by uncompensated

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
See id. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i).
See id. § 1.513-1(c) for some examples.
See, e.g., infra notes 128-141 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) (2006).
Id. § 512(b)(5).
Id. § 512(b)(2).
Id. § 512(b)(3); see also Rev. Rul. 69-178, 1969-1 C.B. 158 (interpreting the
rental exception).
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volunteers;132 activities carried on primarily for the convenience of
members, students, patients, officers, or employees;133 a trade or
business consisting of the sale of donated merchandise;134 activities
whose purpose is to attract and educate persons at trade shows,
conventions, or fairs;135 particular hospital services performed by certain
qualified hospitals;136 bingo games;137 qualified utility pole rentals;138
distribution of low cost items incidental to charitable contribution
solicitations;139 income from renting member lists to other charities;140
and sponsorship payments.141
As is the case with activities that are performed only irregularly,
there is not much economic or other justification behind the exclusion of
many of these activities from UBIT.142 Reforming the treatment of these
activities will be discussed along with general UBIT reform, infra Part
V.
D. SUMMARY
Similar to the requirements for federal tax exemption, the criteria
for UBIT imposition are fraught with ambiguity, leaving exempt
organizations often uncertain of whether an activity will remain exempt
132. See I.R.C. § 513(a)(1). The voluntary labor must be the primary component to
gain exemption from UBIT. Rev. Rul. 78-144, 1978-1 C.B. 168 (long-term leasing of
heavy machinery was not exempt from UBIT, even though volunteers performed the
work of securing lease contracts). A case-by-case approach is adopted if the volunteers
are compensated in kind to determine whether they are deemed uncompensated
volunteers. See Waco Lodge No. 166 v. Comm’r, 696 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1983)
(determining that provision of free drinks for which others must pay, but which
translated to an effective pay of 63 cents per hour, did not disallow treatment as
volunteers).
133. I.R.C. § 513(a)(2).
134. Id. § 513(a)(3).
135. Id. § 513(d).
136. See id. § 513(e).
137. Id. § 513(f)(1).
138. Id. § 513(g).
139. Id. § 513(h)(1)(A).
140. Id. § 513(h)(1)(B). These charities must be exempt organizations that enable
contributions to them to be deductible. See id.
141. Id. § 513(i).
142. They could have powerful political lobbyists, however.
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from federal tax. The requirement of relatedness to an exempt purpose is
common to both the exemptions and the UBIT, and its uncertainty
thereby impacts both. This uncertainty is ultimately a significant driving
force behind nonprofits’ decisions to use for-profit subsidiaries for some
activities since nonprofits have much to lose if they incorrectly guess
how an activity will affect their exemption. The following Part expands
upon this point, examining how and why nonprofits currently use forprofit subsidiaries.
IV. USE OF FOR-PROFIT SUBSIDIARIES BY EXEMPT NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS
Generally, there are three reasons why exempt nonprofits elect to
use taxable for-profit subsidiaries. First, using taxable subsidiaries used
to be a way exempt nonprofits could escape tax altogether.143 Such
“income stripping” is largely unavailable today due to legislative
changes.144 Second, for-profit subsidiaries may be used if the activity is
one that is entirely for-profit in nature. These activities have no
probability of being exempt, and they may gain little if anything from
the non-distribution constraint that accompanies the nonprofit form.
Finally, and most pivotally for this Article, exempt nonprofits may
conduct activities in for-profit subsidiaries even if the activity has a
distinct probability of being exempt, for fear that if the activity is
deemed nonexempt, the organization would lose its exempt status if the
activity were conducted by the parent.145 The recent rise of joint
ventures in the healthcare field provides a good example of this latter
behavior.146
143.
144.
145.

See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 7, at 1126.
See id. at 1127.
See supra Part II.C (discussing the potential consequences for a nonprofit when
one of its activities is deemed nonexempt).
146. There are other reasons why exempt nonprofits might want to use for-profit
subsidiaries. For example, some activities performed by exempt organizations may be
subjected to state regulation, leading the exempt organization to isolate these activities
within a subsidiary. See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in ForProfit and Not-For-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax
Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 85 (1995) (noting that because some states
prohibit the corporate practice of medicine, some hospitals cannot directly own
physician practices). Some other reasons for using for-profit subsidiaries may be more
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A. INCOME STRIPPING
An historical use of for-profit subsidiaries was a technique known
as income stripping, where the nonprofit avoided taxation on a
nonexempt activity by placing it in a for-profit subsidiary. If the
subsidiary performed the activity, it could then pay the proceeds from
the activity as interest or rent to the parent. The subsidiary gained an
offsetting deduction for this rent or interest resulting in no net tax to it,
and the parent was not taxed on the interest or rental payments as
activity statutorily excluded from UBIT.147 The net result was that the
organization engaged in the taxable activity without paying tax.
The legislature addressed this technique with I.R.C. § 512(b)(15)
(now (b)(13)), passed in 1969, which forced parent organizations to
include as income any payments received by controlled organizations

insidious. For instance, while exempt nonprofits must publicly disclose information
related to financials and operations via IRS. Form 990, private for-profits generally do
not. See Annual Exempt Organization Return: Who Must File, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.
gov/charities/article/0,,id=152729,00.html (last updated Sept. 19, 2011). In some cases,
private for-profits may have a similar disclosure duty, such as when they are publiclytraded and must make periodic public disclosures under the federal securities laws.
These disclosures are available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Oct. 19,
2011). Non-disclosing for-profit subsidiaries thus offer an opportunity to hide
compensation, making the nonprofit more acceptable in the public eye while it pays
nonprofit officers through its for-profit subsidiary. See Reed Abelson, Charities Use
For-Profit Units to Avoid Disclosing Finances, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998, at A1. Forprofit subsidiaries may also allow nonprofits to shift deductible costs to the for-profit
and revenues to the exempt nonprofit, a potential problem the IRS has recognized. See
infra note 285. Aside from the tax savings, this also has the added advantage of making
the nonprofit’s operations appear more efficient. Abelson, supra note 146 (exposing
this and other undesirable behavior). Such behavior is fairly risky, however. Using a
for-profit subsidiary to avoid financial disclosures risks public backlash upon exposure;
and the practice of shifting costs and revenues between for-profit subsidiaries and their
nonprofit parent, is constrained by accounting rules, and could result in penalties if the
statements are fraudulent. The IRS also requires costs and revenues among related
organizations to be allocated based on actual use and fair market value, and failure to
do so can result in exemption revocation. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-08-047
(Dec. 4, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-26-102 (Apr. 7, 1986), modified, I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 86-45-064 (Aug. 13, 1986); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-05-038 (Nov. 5, 1985).
147. See I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(1), (b)(3) (2006).
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that reduce the controlled organization’s tax liability.148 This restriction
was expanded in 1997 to require an organization to include exempt
payments from another organization if the two share a common
parent.149 Prior to this 1997 expansion, organizations could still escape
taxation by placing activities in indirect subsidiaries; if exempt A
controlled exempt B and for-profit C, and C controlled for-profit D,
taxation could be avoided by placing activities in D and receiving rent
and interest from D,150 or by placing activities in C or D and having
exempt B receive rent and interest payments.151 Although I.R.C. section
513(b)(13) now eliminates the usefulness of for-profit subsidiaries as an
income stripping device, 152 some modern structures could be left over
from this period. Other than administrative streamlining, the exempt
nonprofit may have little incentive to fold the for-profit subsidiary’s
activities back into the parent if the activities will then incur equivalent
UBIT.153
B. COMPLETELY NONEXEMPT ACTIVITY
Another reason an exempt nonprofit would use a for-profit
subsidiary is if the nonprofit wishes to engage in a nonexempt activity.
Nonexempt activities incur UBIT liability and are taxed as if performed
by a for-profit organization,154 so housing the activity within the
nonprofit offers no tax advantage. In addition, as previously discussed,
148. See Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(b)(2)(C), 83 Stat. 487,
539-40.
149. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13); see also Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997, 1997-4
C.B. 1081, 1248-1250 (discussing the reasons for extending the restriction to such
constructive indirect ownership).
150. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-38-003 (June 16, 1993) (stating that rent
paid by an organization analogous to for-profit D in order to exempt A would not be
taxable to A).
151. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-16-034 (Jan. 26, 2007) (stating that interest
received or accrued by Hospital and Parent from the PCs is gross income derived from
an unrelated trade or business under I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(A)).
152. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
153. Such consolidation could even threaten the parent’s exemption if it is deemed
not insubstantial and not related to exempt purposes—the two operational requirements
for federal exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
154. See I.R.C. § 512.
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nonexempt activities, if performed by the parent, can jeopardize a
nonprofit’s exempt status if the activities are unrelated to exempt
purposes and are not insubstantial.155 If the activities are performed
through a subsidiary, however, the parent’s exemption is not risked.156
Even when the activity would not threaten the parent’s exemption,
the parent may have other good reasons to place the activity within a
for-profit subsidiary. Choosing the nonprofit form and its accompanying
non-distribution constraint entails significant costs, including higher
costs of capital and decreased managerial efficiency from loss of the
residual profit incentive.157 Therefore, in cases where the nonprofit form
has little benefit to offer in solving agency problems or information
asymmetries or in attracting donations, the activity would be more
efficiently carried out by a for-profit subsidiary.158 Such is commonly
the case with many commercial activities, which are financed through
the sale of goods and services rather than donations, and which often
lack the information asymmetries that nonprofits are better positioned to
solve. Because the financial cost to incorporate a subsidiary is
insignificant,159 the relative benefits from housing the activity within a
subsidiary need only slightly outweigh those from keeping the activity
within the parent. Therefore, one would expect to see purely commercial
activities, as well as other activities not benefiting from the nonprofit
form, conducted by for-profit subsidiaries.
As an example, when the exempt nonprofit College Board160—the
group that composes and administers standardized tests including the

155.
156.

See supra Parts II.A & B (discussing the operational test).
The IRS respects the separation between parent and subsidiary in this respect,
as long as the subsidiary is viewed as a bona fide separate legal entity, meaning it has
some business activity independent from the parent. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,326 (Jan. 17, 1985). See generally SANDERS, supra note 2, at 236-39 (discussing
reasons for using subsidiaries in joint ventures and the bona fide requirement).
157. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
158. If the activity would benefit from the non-distribution constraint but is
nevertheless non-exempt, it could be placed in a nonprofit subsidiary.
159. Currently the cost to form a Delaware for-profit or nonprofit corporation is
$89.00. DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS FEE
SCHEDULE (Aug. 1, 2009), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/Aug09feesch.pdf.
160. The College Board’s most recent several Forms 990 are available at College
Entrance Examination Board, GUIDESTAR.ORG, http://www2.guidestar.org/ReportNon
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SAT and Advanced Placement exams—decided to branch out into
serving college applicants through assistance with filling out financial
forms, it chose to conduct these activities within a for-profit
subsidiary.161 Assisting with students’ completion of forms stood little
chance of escaping taxation, and the nonprofit commitment structure has
little benefit to offer. The for-profit form, on the other hand, offered
several benefits, such as attraction of investor capital as well as pay
structures—specifically stock options—that could not be offered by a
nonprofit.162 The College Board is not the only example of this type of
behavior.163 For-profit subsidiaries are the efficient organizational form
for such activity from the parent’s and society’s perspectives, and are
not something requiring legislative attention.
C. MIXED ACTIVITIES
The final use of for-profit subsidiaries by exempt nonprofit parents
shares some similarities with the scenario just discussed. Just as in the
previous scenario, the activity placed in the for-profit subsidiary has
nonexempt components; however, in this mixed activities case, an
inseparable portion of the activity also furthers the parent’s exempt

Profit.aspx?ein=13-1623965&name=college-entrance-examination-board# (last visited
May 25, 2011).
161. See Jodi Wilgoren, Aged Upstart, College Board, Is Joining Gold Rush on
Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, at A1.
162. See id.
163. For example, the PGA Tour, a nonprofit exempt business league, owns and
operates a series of golf courses through its for-profit subsidiary PGA Tour Golf Course
Properties. See Tournament Players Club History, TCP.COM, http://www.tpc.com/tpc/
courses/tpc.asp?id=3&page=253 (last visited May 25, 2011); PGA Tour Inc Forms 990,
GUIDESTAR.ORG, available at http://www2.guidestar.org/organizations/52-0999206
/pga-tour.aspx# (last visited May 25, 2011). Exempt hospitals conduct a variety of
activities through for-profit subsidiaries, including catering services, cleaning services
at unrelated organizations, home medical supplies, billing and consulting services for
doctors starting up new practices, printing services, and medical equipment repair.
Michael Abramowitz, Nonprofit Hospitals Venture into New Lines of Business, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 1987, at A1; Richard L. Madden, For Hospitals, New Ventures and New
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1987, at 1; Wendy Swallow, Nonprofit Hospitals and
Their Profits on the Side, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1985, at 14.
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purposes.164 Here, the decision to use a for-profit subsidiary could still
be the efficient form. In many cases, however, the decision to use forprofit subsidiaries is made because nonprofit parents fear losing their
exemption, and unpredictable tax guidance makes it difficult to
determine how great a threat the activity poses to exemption if
conducted by the parent.165
1. When For-Profit Subsidiaries Are Efficient
Even if the tax law were entirely predictable regarding whether an
activity would result in revocation of an exemption, the most efficient
choice for some of these mixed activities might still be to place them
within a for-profit subsidiary. Such would be the case if the nonprofit
form and its non-distribution constraint were too restricting or if the
activity had only a minor charitable component and thus stood little to
gain from being housed within an exempt entity.
One such situation might be the College Board example discussed
previously.166 In addition to assistance in completing forms, the College
Board also began a lower-cost SAT tutoring program.167 The nondistribution constraint would have prevented the College Board from
attracting equity investors and from using certain compensation

164. By inseparable, I mean that the exempt and for-profit components could not
easily be separated and conducted by different entities. A museum gift shop selling both
exempt and non-exempt items is one example. It would not be practical to divide the
gift shop operations into two entities: one exempt and one nonexempt.
I am also assuming here that the non-exempt portion does not benefit from
being conducted by the nonprofit form and its ability to overcome agency problems. If
it did, then it would be housed in a nonprofit subsidiary just like when the activity is
entirely non-exempt, and the subsidiary might as well try for an exemption. See supra
note 158. It may be easier to obtain exempt treatment for this activity if it is kept within
the parent rather than when it is in the subsidiary. The entity-level ratio of exempt to
nonexempt activities, and hence exemption likelihood, may be lower when the activity
is placed within a subsidiary (and is the sole determinant of the ratio) than when it is
conducted by the parent (which has other exempt activities to affect the ratio). See infra
notes 172-176 and accompanying text for additional analysis of this issue.
165. See supra Part II.C.
166. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
167. See Wilgoren, supra note 161.
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methods.168 Any charitable benefits from lower cost tutoring were
relatively small compared to the advertising revenue and fees the
organization hoped to gain.169 The nonprofit form also had little benefit
to offer, since for activities with readily-ascertainable quality such as
SAT tutoring, reputation is an easier and less-costly substitute for the
non-distribution constraint commitment. All these considerations push
towards a for-profit subsidiary as the efficient organizational tool.
Observe that if performing the activity were only marginally more
efficient when done by a for-profit, the exempt parent in a world of clear
IRS guidance or low stakes at risk would still likely keep the activity
within its parent organization irrespective of how small the exempt
component was, as long as the nonexempt portion did not unduly
threaten the nonprofit’s exemption. By keeping the activity within the
parent, the parent would gain an exemption on the charitable
component, which would otherwise be taxed at the corporate rate if
performed by a for-profit subsidiary. This disparate treatment emerges
because of the IRS’s refusal to grant partial exemptions to for-profits for
the value of their charitable behavior.
Similarly, the exempt parent would also keep the mixed activity
within the parent if the activity were better performed by a nonprofit.
Activities which have relatively-small charitable components might not
qualify for exemption on their own if placed in a nonprofit subsidiary.
However, the nonexempt portions of these activities may not be
substantial enough to risk the nonprofit’s exemption if performed
directly by the nonprofit parents. Were these activities performed by a
nonexempt subsidiary, they would be taxed in their entirety. On the
other hand, by keeping these activities within the exempt parent, the
nonprofit can pay taxes on only the nonemempt portion of the
activity.170
168.
169.
170.

See id.
See id.
Placing the activity within a separate organization may still provide some
benefits that could cause the parent to use a subsidiary even if the activity would not
threaten the parent’s exemption. For example, partitioning activities and assets across
distinct organizations can result in favorable contracting and financing terms, as well as
liability shielding. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000) (discussing the different types of asset
partitioning). Placing different activities within different organizations may also help
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Of course, if the mixed activity’s charitable component were
substantial enough, the parent could just obtain exempt status for the
nonprofit subsidiary, which would have the same taxation effect as if the
activity had been conducted by the exempt parent itself.171 In this case,
other organizational elements such as asset partitioning, liability
shielding, and breadth of the parent’s charitable purpose would
determine whether the activity should be performed within an exempt
nonprofit subsidiary or instead performed by the parent.172 Thus, when
National Geographic acquired the JASON project, which provides
educational materials to students on science and technology matters,173 it
chose to operate the project as an exempt subsidiary, rather than within
the exempt parent, National Geographic.174
2. When For-Profit Subsidiaries Are Inefficient but Are Used
Nevertheless
On the other hand, activities may be placed in a for-profit
subsidiary when it would be more socially efficient if they were engaged
in by the exempt nonprofit parent. Such might be the case with an
exempt parent considering an activity with a significant charitable
promote accountability for individual activities, increasing overall performance. See
Plunkett & Christianson, supra note 113, at 17.
171. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2008).
172. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 172, for a discussion of asset
partitioning.
173. See What is JASON?, JASON.ORG, http://www.jason.org/public/whatis/jason
.aspx (last visited May 25, 2011).
174. About JASON – National Geographic, JASON.ORG, http://www.jason.org
/public/WhatIs/AboutNGS.aspx (last visited May 25, 2011). JASON has continued
filing Forms 990 as a self-contained exempt subsidiary. The forms are available at The
JASON Project, GUIDESTAR.ORG, http://www2.guidestar.org/organizations/52-1645651
/jason-project.aspx# (last visited May 25, 2011).
One likely explanation for keeping JASON as a separate subsidiary is that
JASON previously existed as an independent entity before National Geographic’s
acquisition, so its creditors would have sought to ensure that JASON’s assets remained
partitioned and pledged solely for those creditor’s claims, rather than for National
Geographic’s general creditors. See Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Economic
and Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts (draft Sept. 2010), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/law_economics/documents/Ayotte_Hans
mann.pdf.
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component in the face of high-risk unclear IRS guidance on whether the
activity might result in exemption revocation. By conducting the activity
through a for-profit subsidiary, the parent gains the security of a
continuing unthreatened parental exemption, at the cost of taxation on
the charitable component of the activities placed within the for-profit
subsidiary.175
Consistent with this idea, Professors Michelle Yetman and Robert
Yetman empirically found that exempt organizations are more likely to
use taxable subsidiaries for nonexempt activity when the activity
provides a greater threat to the parent’s exemption.176 Although the
measure of the nonexempt activity’s threat was imperfect,177 the findings
nevertheless support the idea that organizations are responding to IRS
uncertainty in predictable, but undesirable, ways.178
Conducting these mixed activities within a for-profit subsidiary
reduces the extent to which the exempt portion is provided. Because the
exempt portion is taxed when conducted by a for-profit subsidiary,
payoffs to the organization on the exempt portion will be lower when
conducted by a for-profit subsidiary than when conducted by an exempt
nonprofit parent. Payoffs on the nonexempt portion would be identical,
because the UBIT paid by the nonprofit parent equals the corporate tax
paid by the for-profit subsidiary.179 This decrease in provision of exempt
services is inefficient if we assume that the charitable exemption serves
some function of promoting desirable activity—an assumption without
which the charitable exemption is difficult to justify.180
175. This tradeoff is discussed in the hospital joint venture context in Meyers, supra
note 107, at 492-94.
176. Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, Why Do Nonprofits Have Taxable
Subsidiaries?, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 675, 677 (2008).
177. The size of non-exempt revenue relative to overall revenue was used as a proxy
for threat of exemption revocation. See id. at 683. As discussed previously, the IRS has
announced that the relative revenue derived from non-exempt activity by itself will not
result in revocation. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. High ratios of nonexempt revenue to overall revenue may be symptomatic of other factors leading to
exemption revocation, however.
178. See Yetman & Yetman, supra note 178, at 686.
179. The UBIT tax rate is equal to the corporate tax rate. See I.R.C. § 511(a)(1)
(2006).
180. See, e.g., supra Part I.A (discussing exempt nonprofits’ role as providers of
public goods); see also Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
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Nonprofit hospitals provide an illuminating example of how
nonprofits are responding to unpredictable and changing IRS opinions in
cases where much is at risk. This area has given rise to much of the
current use of for-profit subsidiaries.181 Confronted with decreased
government funding and reimbursements and increased competition for
services, hospitals have had to engage in new activities to continue as
viable operations.182 Undertaking these activities as joint ventures with
for-profit partners provides a variety of advantages, but their tax
treatment is often uncertain.183 Consequently, as expected, the uncertain

Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981) (postulating
that the exemption should serve as a subsidy for nonprofits’ inability to raise capital as
easily as for-profit organizations, but that only those nonprofits that have a comparative
advantage to for-profits at supplying a particular good should be exempt). Some
academics have argued that for-profits should receive an exemption covering their
charitable activities. See, e.g., Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit
Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017 (2007). But subsidies for for-profit charitable activities
are not necessary to overcome capital constraints, and are also not as justified if we
view nonprofits as more “deserving” of public assistance. See Mark A. Hall & John D.
Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
1379 (1991).
Of course, while solving the public goods problem is an important aspect of the
exemption’s justification, there are additional ones. For instance, the exemption may
promote distributive justice or pluralism. See Fleischer, supra note 12 (arguing that
distributive justice plays an important role in justifying the current system of
exemptions); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 404-08 (1998)
(concluding that a virtue of the exemption system is how it allows individuals to
allocate federal dollars to exempt nonprofits). These additional justifications do not
change the need for reform, however; distributive justice and pluralism goals could be
achieved through manipulating what is charitable and what is related. Once these
parameters have been set, we still want parent nonprofits to choose the appropriate
corporate form in which to conduct these activities and to not have uncertainty
regarding overall exempt status unduly affect the decision. These goals can be achieved
with a reform as suggested infra Part V.
181. Much of this has been in the area of joint ventures. See SANDERS, supra note 2,
at 5-7, 211.
182. See, e.g., id. at 5-7, 211; McGovern, supra note 7, at 1128-29.
183. The tax guidance on joint ventures is still fairly undeveloped and uncertain, as
evidenced by the numerous works attempting to analyze or reform it. See John D.
Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063 (2006); Meyers, supra
note 107; Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change Its
Stance on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21 (2005);
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tax treatment from conducting these ventures directly has pushed
hospitals to use for-profit subsidiaries, decreasing the frequency with
which desirable joint ventures will occur.184
D. SUMMARY
As we have seen, nonprofits have a variety of reasons for
employing for-profit subsidiaries. While the decision is always
economically efficient from the exempt parent’s perspective, when the
activities have a charitable component but may threaten exemption if
conducted by the parent directly, the decision to place them within a
nonexempt subsidiary is not socially optimal.
There are two methods of approaching this problem: reduce
uncertainty or reduce the stakes at risk. Because of the complex nature
of the modern economy, some sort of facts-and-circumstances inquiry
by the IRS seems inevitable for determining when exemptions should be
revoked. Therefore, it seems unavoidable that the exemption system will
have a degree of unpredictability. The best approach, then, may be to
reduce the stakes. These suggested reforms are taken up in the following
Part.
V. REFORMING EXEMPTION AND UBIT LAW
There are two general ways to change exemption and UBIT law
that retain their desirable attributes while eliminating the uncertainty
that forces nonprofits to use for-profit subsidiaries. First, attaining the
exemption could be made more rigorous. This would give the exemption
a gate-keeping function that could sift out potential exempt nonprofits
that would engage in significant nonexempt activity either directly or
through subsidiaries. Under this reform, which retains the same
principles of the current system, nonprofits must satisfy predictable
limiting rules regarding their charitable and nonexempt activities to
Plunkett & Christianson, supra note 113, at 46-47. Typical of the sentiment regarding
joint ventures, it has been noted that “the [IRS]’s formal guidance leaves substantial
uncertainty about the boundaries between ventures that exempt organizations can
engage in without adverse consequences and those that risk . . . loss of exemption.”
Meyers, supra note 107, at 503.
184. See McGovern, supra note 7.
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obtain and retain exempt status. This reform thus seeks to increase
predictability of the exemption system.
The second reform, which I ultimately advocate, approaches the
problem from the opposite direction, by broadening the implementation
of the UBIT so that it covers all unrelated non-charitable activities,
unlike the patchwork that currently exists. With this change, exemption
requirements would be relaxed so that any nonprofit organization
desiring exempt status could achieve it.
A. REFORM 1: EXEMPTION AS GATEKEEPER
The first reform approach would tighten exemption requirements,
making it more difficult for nonprofits to achieve exempt status. A
prototypical method of doing so would suggest a rebuttable presumption
in favor of exemption when a nonprofit’s charitable revenues and
charitable expenses exceed its unrelated revenues and expenses by a
specified ratio.185 These revenues and expenses would include nonprofit
parent as well as subsidiary figures. When this ratio is not met, the IRS
would engage in a facts-and-circumstances inquiry to determine whether
exemption is still warranted.186 The ratio could easily be adjusted to
allow a presumption of exemption when organizations engage in
relatively more or relatively less unrelated activity.
The reform possesses several virtues. Foremost among them is the
safe harbor created for organizations that meet the required ratio of
exempt to nonexempt activities. Through the administration of an
apparently simple rule, exempt organizations could gain certainty on
whether activities threaten their exemption. Thus, if an organization
would remain below the pivotal threshold, even if the activity under
consideration were deemed unrelated, there would be no reason to
conduct the activity outside of the parent; the exemption would be safe.
Proposed versions of the reform provide an additional reason to
conduct the activity within the exempt parent, rather than within a
subsidiary—the consolidation of subsidiary activities with parent

185. Peña & Reid, supra note 9, at 1890. A simple example would be a one to one
ratio, where the rebuttable presumption for exemption arises when charitable activities
are at least as great as noncharitable activities.
186. Id. at 1895-96.
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activities when computing the required threshold ratio.187 As a result of
this consolidation, there would be no incentive to use for-profit
subsidiaries in situations where it would be more efficient to have the
parent conduct an activity directly.
On the other hand, the reform also has several significant
disadvantages. Most importantly, the reform’s safe harbor test may not
provide the certainty that its simple rule promises, since activities must
still be classified as either exempt or nonexempt. This difficulty of
classification188 is the driving force in today’s tax system behind many
nonprofits’ decisions to safeguard their exemption by using for-profit
subsidiaries. If the exempt nonprofit is unsure how its activities will be
classified, then the ratio’s safe harbor provides little certainty.
Compounding this problem is the consolidation aspect of this
reform, which takes into account both the parent’s and the subsidiaries’
activities when computing the ratio. This consolidation means placing
activities that might be considered unrelated in a subsidiary that would
no longer provide a safeguard for the parent’s exemption. Under this
consolidation rule, therefore, organizations would have to limit not only
for-profit activities for which they possessed a comparative advantage,
but also mixed charitable activities with uncertainty regarding their
characterization. This outcome is undesirable.
Of course, the consolidation element of this suggested reform is not
essential to the idea of using exemption as a gatekeeper. Eliminating
consolidation from this reform means that exempt parents could, like
today, engage in nonexempt behavior indirectly through subsidiaries
without risking the parent’s overall exemption. Such behavior is not
necessarily undesirable, and will be discussed in greater detail in the
context of my suggested Reform 2 proposal. Without consolidation,
however, this reform looks very similar to the current regime. The
inability to determine definitively ex ante what is an exempt activity and
what is nonexempt renders the safe harbor largely ineffective.

187. See id. at 1895.
188. See supra Parts II.A & III.A (discussing the difficulty in determining whether
an activity is related or unrelated to exempt purposes).
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B. REFORM 2: POLICING THROUGH UBIT
The second, and better,189 option for reform is to recognize that an
inexact case-by-case approach is inevitable given the complexities of the
modern economy, and that reducing the stakes without jeopardizing the
goals of the exemption process is the superior policy.190 This approach
would allow most nonprofit organizations to achieve an exemption and
conduct as much nonexempt activity as desired, as long as nonexempt
activity was appropriately taxed as UBIT. This reform has the virtue of
drastically reducing the exemption risk that nonexempt activity currently
poses, which means that subsidiaries will be used only when socially
efficient and not as a tool to preserve a parent’s exemption. For this
reform to be implemented effectively, the UBIT must be modified to
encompass all unrelated nonexempt activity.
1. Broadening the UBIT’s Scope
Currently, under the UBIT, activities that are regularly carried on
and that are not substantially related to exempt purposes, are taxed as
ordinary income.191 Several enumerated statutory provisions exempt
additional activities from the UBIT that otherwise would qualify.192
However, even the UBIT’s original goal of taxing activity that competes
with nonexempt commercial organizations,193 does not provide a broad
enough definition for the suggested reform. It is too narrow to serve the
189. Such an approach in the tax context has been compared to the property/liability
rule distinction in property law. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Protecting Tax Statuses with
Liability Rules and Property Rules, YLS MOOT CAMP (2011) (on file with author).
Blair-Stanek generally recommends liability rule protection in tax law for many of the
same reasons as are discussed throughout this Article. Id at 19-24.
190. Professor John Colombo has suggested a similar general type of reform for
regulating nonprofit commercial activity that also aims to improve predictability. See,
e.g., Colombo, supra note 88, at 688-89; John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and
Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 556-59 (2002). Professor
Colombo himself views his type of reform as only second-best. Id. at 556-57. I will
argue that, while the general idea should be implemented, there are several specifics as
outlined in Reform 2 that differ substantially from prior proposals.
191. See I.R.C. §§ 513(a), 512(a)(1) (2006).
192. See supra notes 127-141 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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proposed function of taxing all non-charitable activity and ensuring that
organizations choose the most efficient form.
Academics have noted that the UBIT promotes economic efficiency
by forcing nonprofits to compete with for-profits on equal footing in
noncharitable (unrelated) activities.194 These arguments are applicable
irrespective of whether the activity is regularly carried on, whether the
activity is a bingo game, and in some cases even whether the activity is
related. Without UBIT, exempt nonprofits could operate at margins that
for a for-profit would result in losses after taxes.195 This subsidized
exempt activity at the expense of for-profit provision incurs costs such
as incentives for exempt nonprofits to not diversify investments,196
managerial inefficiencies as operations grow and expand outside the
nonprofit’s area of expertise,197 excess saving by nonprofits,198 and
providing subsidies to nonprofit firms inversely proportional to their
needs.199 While nonprofits may undoubtedly consider more than just a
project’s rate of return when deciding which activities to undertake,200 it
must also be true that nonprofits do not ignore returns entirely; they
cannot operate with losses forever, and so it is important to ensure these
194. See, e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 613 (1989). Professor Colombo also recognizes this
concern and addresses it through application of a difficult to define “commercial
activity” tax. Colombo, supra note 192, at 557-559. His discussion does not consider
the statutory exemptions or how they would fare under a “commercial activity” tax.
195. See Hansmann, supra note 196, at 610. Nonprofits also need only break even,
while for-profits must generally provide a positive return on equity.
196. See id. at 614-15. Recall the behavior of New York University, supra note 63,
which operated several businesses having few, if any, synergies with the University.
The University was motivated to wholly own and operate businesses thereby making
the businesses exempt, rather than broadly diversifying investments across nonexempt
activities.
197. See Hansmann, supra note 196, at 616-17.
198. See id. at 619-21. This point stems from the incentive to own and operate
commercial exempt feeder organizations.
199. See id. at 621.
200. See, e.g., Burton A. Weisbrod, Modeling the Nonprofit Organization as a
Multiproduct Firm: A Framework for Choice, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT 47, 5255 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998) (noting that nonprofits may take into account more
than just profit maximization); Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24
YALE J. ON REG. 139, 191 (2007) (concluding that profit-making is likely a lower
priority for nonprofit hospitals than for for-profits).
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economic incentives result in efficient behavior. Let us now apply these
insights to activities currently excluded from the UBIT to determine
which activities should remain excluded and which should be taxed as
ordinary income.
a. Intermittent Activity
Consider first the case of UBIT exemption for activities not
regularly carried on. Activities that are not regularly carried on will
compete with for-profits, although not as strongly as regularly carried on
activities would. Such unfair competition was one of the primary forces
behind the UBIT’s creation.201 The idea behind this exemption may be
that activities pursued only irregularly will be insubstantial or not
pursued assiduously enough to compete in a meaningful way with forprofits that engage in the activity full time. However, that is not always
the case.202 To the extent that exempt nonprofits can engage in irregular
activities without having them considered regularly carried on, this
exemption promotes inefficiencies in the manners discussed above.
Applying the UBIT to intermittent activities would create
administrative implementation and compliance costs that might exceed
any economic efficiency gains that would result. However, these
administrative costs would likely be small in comparison to the size of
many of the involved activities; nonprofit firms could accurately classify
some of their sporadic activities as either related or unrelated, and the
body of guidance will only grow over time. Annual fundraisers whose
function is to raise revenue to further exempt purposes, for example,
would clearly be categorized as unrelated and subjected to the UBIT. If
irregular activity is meant as a proxy for low-volume activity, an explicit
de minimis exception from UBIT would be more appropriate than an

201.
202.

See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
Consider a provocative hypothetical example of a charity occasionally
providing investment banking services, yielding millions of dollars in revenue exempt
from UBIT because it is not regularly carried on. Peña & Reid, supra note 9, at 1888.
Such behavior would clearly compete with for-profit investment banking services, and
it would provide a significant subsidy to the exempt organization unrelated to its
charitable operations. While this particular example may be unlikely to occur, the point
remains a good one.
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intermittent activity exemption.203 Thus, activity not regularly carried on
should not be exempted from the UBIT.
b. Statutorily-Enumerated Exceptions
While a de minimis exception to the UBIT may be appropriate in
light of the administrative costs that would otherwise be incurred, many
of the statutorily-excluded activities can be substantial in nature and
compete with traditional commercial activities. For instance, an exempt
organization can run statutorily-excluded bingo operations with annual
revenue in excess of $1 million and remain free from UBIT
application.204 These operations compete with other taxed sources of
entertainment. Activities performed by volunteers can also be
substantial and compete with for-profit organizations. Despite this, any
business where “substantially all the work in carrying on such business
is performed for the organization without compensation” would
presumably be exempt.205 As is the case with irregular activities, these
exemptions are inappropriate, and subjecting them to UBIT would
increase efficiency.
Other statutorily-exempt UBIT activities, although potentially
substantial, may not yield increases in economic efficiency if subjected
to the UBIT. Royalties from member list rentals are one example. These
rentals can be substantial—they can generate revenue in excess of

203. Recall that such an exception already exists, but only with respect to gifts given
incidental to charitable contributions. See I.R.C. § 513(h) (2006).
204. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-11-003 (Nov. 8, 1995). Although the Ruling
does not state the annual Bingo revenues, it is possible to calculate the revenue from
other information in the Ruling. In 1993, the organization spent $17,459 on exempt
activities. In the same year, 1.41% of its expenditures were spent on “other activities
including charitable programs,” meaning it spent at least 0.0141 or $1.238 million all
together in 1993. In addition, 95.14% of its expenditures in 1993 were for the bingo
operation, which translates to 0.9514 x $1.238 million or at least $1.178 million. See id.
at 12-13.
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(e)(1) (as amended in 1983). The Regulation provides as
an example of such exempt behavior an exempt organization operating a retail store
selling to the general public, with work performed by uncompensated volunteers. Such
an operation would appear, in reality, to compete directly with for-profit providers. See
id. at § 1.513-1(e)(3).
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several hundred thousand dollars per year to an organization206—yet
they are generally a byproduct of a nonprofit’s operations. The nonprofit
likely incurs minimal extra cost from assembling these lists and engages
in minimal additional effort to accumulate members solely for the lists,
so its overall behavior should be largely unaffected by whether or not
UBIT is imposed.207 To the extent UBIT could raise desirable tax
revenue and avoid excessive tax base erosion, it should be imposed;
however, the net economic effect from taxing these activities could be
negative because of additional administrative costs208 associated with
UBIT compliance and administration.209 Sponsorship payments would
follow a similar analysis.
Notably, the statutory UBIT exemptions for passive investment
income, including dividends, should be retained. Recall that dividends,
interest payments, and annuities are excluded from UBIT.210 Consider
the case of dividends.211 As others have noted, without the dividend
exception, exempt nonprofits would have the incentive to conduct
businesses directly (incurring taxation on dividends as UBIT once)
rather than indirectly through stock ownership (incurring taxation on
dividends twice; once when they are earned by the stock company, and
once when they are paid to the exempt organization).212 This incentive
206. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming
exemption of fixed royalty from member list rental, as well as 0.5% royalty of Sierra
Club credit card purchases).
207. It is true that nonprofits might devote some resources to building valuable
membership lists. If such activity is low-cost, it is relatively harmless because it has no
significant economic effect on the efficient mix of resources produced by society. The
UBIT exemption would allow the nonprofit to compete on advantageous terms with
for-profit list aggregators, but it is not immediately clear how worrisome this potential
distortion is.
208. These administrative costs would be reduced to the extent that broader UBIT
application is administratively easier; fewer UBIT exceptions means more predictability
and easier administration.
209. If UBIT decreases are compensated for by increased tax revenue from other
sources, rather than from decreases in public spending, it is unclear whether the
deadweight losses from taxing the other sources would be greater or less than the
avoided losses from no UBIT imposition.
210. I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) (2006).
211. The argument for interest and annuities is similar. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra
note 196, at 625-26.
212. See, e.g., id.
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would persist even when the exempt nonprofit could not conduct the
business as efficiently as a for-profit organization, as long as the
efficiency difference was less than the tax savings from conducting
business directly. The dividend exclusion eliminates this inefficient
incentive.
Of course, one might wonder why this special dividend treatment is
necessary for exempt nonprofits but not for individuals or for-profit
organizations, both of which are taxed twice on dividends.213 This
double taxation gives individuals and for-profit organizations the same
undesirable incentive to conduct businesses directly (even if less
efficiently) as exempt nonprofits would have, without the UBIT
exemption for passive investment income.214 Are individuals and forprofit organizations also in need of a dividend deduction for an efficient
outcome? There are a few possible explanations for why nonprofits may
be particularly responsive to these tax differences, and in turn why
individuals and for-profit organizations may not require similar
treatment as exempt nonprofits. However, the distinction is difficult to
draw with respect to for-profit organizations.
With respect to individuals, it is rarely the case that an individual
has sufficient funds to undertake a major business directly. Even if they
do, they have the option under many circumstances to select an
organizational form that allows pass-through (single) taxation, such as a
213. Dividends are not subject to a complete double tax. For individuals, many
received dividends are taxed at a maximum rate of 15%, although at the moment they
are scheduled to be taxed at the higher ordinary income rates starting in 2013. See
I.R.C. § 102(a) (qualified dividends); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003). For-profit corporations receiving
dividends from other unrelated corporations must include only 30% of the dividend as
income, which translates to a 10.5% additional effective taxable rate on dividends for
corporations in the highest (35%) tax bracket. See I.R.C. § 243(a)(1). If the dividendissuing corporation is at least 80% owned by the for-profit, however, then the for-profit
need not pay taxes on the dividend. See id. §§ 243(b)(2), 1504(a).
214. The lower tax rates for individuals’ qualified dividends, I.R.C. § 1(h)(11), and
for-profits’ inter-corporate dividends, I.R.C. § 243, mitigates, but does not eliminate,
this distortion. Note that until the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in 1986, this
distortion could often be avoided because corporations did not recognize gains or losses
on distributions of property to shareholders. Gen. Utils. Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200
(1935); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2269
(1986) (repeal of the doctrine).
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partnership or limited liability corporation. These facts, coupled with the
significant benefits from diversified ownership that can be achieved at
low cost with stock ownership,215 may mean that even with the
inefficient tax structure, the benefits of indirect ownership via stocks
will outweigh the costs of double taxation to most individuals who
would consider direct business ownership in a double-taxed form.
Exempt nonprofits, on the other hand, often have sizable endowments216
and could more realistically consider conducting businesses directly,
perhaps even operating a diversified portfolio of them. In addition, if
individuals are less inclined to save than are nonprofits, which seems
likely,217 then they would need large incomes before being able to
directly operate a business. Nonprofits, on the other hand, are much
more likely to be in a position to consider this option.
For-profits have the ability to distribute excess earnings to
shareholders via dividends, unlike nonprofits which are prohibited from
doing so due to the non-distribution constraint.218 If a for-profit has used
up all corporate opportunities that might exceed the market rate of
return, it has the option of distributing excess earnings as dividends to
shareholders, rather than investing in other companies through stock
ownership. Shareholders may prefer this action (and make their
preference known to management) even with the accompanying

215. Diversification’s ability to reduce stock return variance without sacrificing
expected return is well known. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, General Proof that
Diversification Pays, 2 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1967).
216. This fact is particularly true of many universities, although other noneducational exempt nonprofits can have significant surpluses as well. See, e.g.,
Hansmann, supra note 196, at 620.
217. Americans’ preference for consumption over savings has been well publicized,
particularly in light of the recent economic downturn. Americans’ savings rates in
recent years have dwindled to their lowest levels since data was available. See U.S.
Table 2.1 Personal Income and Its Disposition, U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, available at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?
SelectedTable=58&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromV
iew=YES&Freq=Qtr&FirstYear=2008&LastYear=2010&3Place=N&AllYearsChk=YE
S&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid (last visited May 25, 2011).
Nonprofits, on the other hand, seem much more disposed towards savings. See,
e.g., Hansmann, supra note 196, at 620 (noting nonprofits’ “perhaps undesirably strong
— tendency to save rather than spend.”).
218. See supra note 4.
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dividend tax, because it allows the individual shareholder to use this
excess however he wants, rather than having the for-profit control its
disposition. Nonprofits, on the other hand, cannot distribute excess
earnings to shareholders.219 If a nonprofit exhausts opportunities that
exceed the market rate of return, the best remaining financial option is to
use remaining funds for stock ownership. If dividends from this
ownership were taxable to the nonprofit, it would open up additional
socially inefficient direct corporate ownership opportunities before the
return on these opportunities again equaled the after-tax market rate of
return.
Yet the same argument could be applied to taxing dividends
accruing to for-profit owner. If there was no difference in behavior
between nonprofits and for-profits in this context, then one could argue
that they should be treated alike.220 Perhaps the decision to exempt
passive investment income for nonprofit firms represents more a desire
to provide additional nonprofit subsidy; fortunately, the decision
promotes efficient behavior at the same time.
However, unlike dividends, the UBIT exemption for capital gains
tax221 should be eliminated—a suggestion that heretofore has been
neglected in the academic literature. The capital gains exemption
promotes the very inefficiency that the dividend exemption avoids.
Consider an exempt nonprofit owning stock in another corporation.
When that corporation sells a capital asset at a gain, the gain is taxed at
the capital gains rates.222 When this gain (reduced by the capital gains
tax) is distributed as a dividend, the exempt nonprofit receives it tax-free
because of the UBIT dividend exemption.223 The net effect is that the
exempt nonprofit receives the gain reduced by the capital gains rate.
On the other hand, if the exempt nonprofit conducted the business
directly, then the same sale of a capital asset would result in no capital

219.
220.

See id.
Efficiency rationales would suggest that neither should be taxed on dividends
received.
221. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(5) (2006).
222. See id. § 1(h). The gain discussed here is the gain relative to the purchase price.
Any gains reflecting depreciation are subjected to capital gains recaptured and taxed at
ordinary rates under I.R.C. § 1250.
223. Id. § 512(b)(1).
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gains tax to the nonprofit,224 as long as the capital asset was not debtfinanced.225 This result seems to hold irrespective of whether the activity
is otherwise subjected to the UBIT.226 Thus, the exempt nonprofit’s
payoff for operating any business directly—whether charitable or not—
is higher relative to indirect ownership through stock holdings. The
incentive for distortions may be heightened if, as I will recommend,
nonprofits could undertake unlimited nonexempt activity without risking
their exemption. However, even if the exemption applied just to
charitable-related property as another subsidy for charitable activity, we
would still have the undesirable situation of pushing exempt nonprofits
to conduct charitable activities directly (and to characterize the income
from these activities as capital gains) instead of investing in for-profits
that may provide an analogous benefit more efficiently.227 Just as the
dividend exemption from UBIT should be kept, so should the capital
gains exemption be eliminated.228
Note that this elimination should not place undue administrative
burdens on charities when disposing of donated property. Donors must
report their basis in donated property to the IRS;229 this information
could be passed along to exempt organizations so that they may

224.
225.
226.

See id. § 512(b)(5).
See id. §§ 512(b)(4), 514(a)(1).
See id. § 512(b)(5) (making no mention of applying in only the case of
charitable activity); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(d) (1992) (not limiting the capital
gains exemption to charitable activities).
227. This outcome would be most common where for-profits provide goods and
services that are ready substitutes for their charitable counterparts, such as healthcare.
228. The goal should be to create indifference between incurring capital gains
directly or indirectly, and eliminating the capital gains exemption for nonprofits would
create this indifference. Without a tax on capital gains, however, this inefficiency exists
with nonprofits, which unfortunately are arguably the most responsive to these
distortions. See supra notes 221-223 and accompanying text. For-profits and
individuals are still taxed more heavily if capital gains are incurred in an asset they own
indirectly through another organization, but the lower tax rates for inter-corporate
dividends, I.R.C. § 243, and qualified dividends, I.R.C. § 1(h)(11), are at least steps
towards achieving this indifference.
229. See I.R.S. Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions (Dec. 2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8283.pdf (requiring individuals and
corporations to provide their basis in any noncash donations exceeding $500).
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compute their capital gains on the excess of the sale price over this
basis.230
Eliminating the distortionary capital gains exemption would
disproportionately reduce funding to those organizations that may be
particularly well-liked by the public, if public approval is evidenced
through willingness to donate. Although these organizations by
extension are perhaps the most deserving, they already receive an initial
disproportionate benefit through the charitable deduction that promotes
donations.231 These organizations are thus arguably least in need of
additional support from a capital gains exemption, due to their relatively
large donations in comparison to other exempt organizations. In
addition, subsidy arguably is better provided based on the extent of
public good provision, and not solely on public popularity.
The remaining statutorily-enumerated exemptions can be disposed
of relatively quickly. Still to be considered are rents, work performed by
volunteers, activities for members’ convenience, the business of selling
donated merchandise, trade show activity, certain hospital services, pole
rentals, and distribution of low cost items incidental to charitable
contribution solicitations.232
Rents could be treated similarly to membership lists or sponsorship
payments, since their taxation, or lack thereof will not greatly affect the
behavior of exempt nonprofits that already have constructed facilities.
However, future behavior would be affected by the taxability. Exempt
organizations may, for instance, construct more spacious or elaborate
facilities than necessary to obtain exempt rental income than they
otherwise would have without exemption. This exemption thus
inefficiently promotes overuse of exempt rental facilities, and should
therefore be eliminated.
Work performed by volunteers should not on its own be exempt
from UBIT solely on the basis of when this work results in something
sold in the marketplace.233 Instead, it should be treated as any other
230.
231.
232.
233.

Capital losses should be allowed to offset capital gains.
The charitable deduction is found at I.R.C. § 170.
See supra notes 128-141 and accompanying text for the complete list.
This qualification avoids taxing those activities that do not result in something
sold in the market, for instance when volunteers paint the interior of a nonprofit
structure. This arrangement comports with taxation policy generally, since a
homeowner who paints the interior of his house is also not taxed on the value of his
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activity of the organization, and it should be exempt only if it furthers a
charitable purpose. Of course, once the work is taxed the nonprofit
should be able to deduct the cost of inputs, which could be difficult
when the volunteers do not receive a wage. A relatively simple,
although perhaps not the most accurate, solution would be to allow a
deduction for hours worked times the minimum wage.
Such volunteer work should be subjected to UBIT scrutiny because
it could easily and inefficiently234 compete with for-profit firms, as
suggested by the Treasury Regulation interpreting the exemption.235 One
might suppose that this volunteer work could represent a subsidy
towards particularly deserving exempt organizations, with deservingness
evidenced by the degree of volunteer support. However, as previously
discussed, there are already other less distortionary ways this outcome
will emerge. For instance, deserving organizations already receive
subsidy through the deductibility of donations (a measure of
deservingness), and additional deductions for deservingness may be
unnecessary.
Activities for members’ convenience, business comprised of selling
donated property, trade show activity, certain hospital services, and pole
rentals should all generally not be exempted on their own unless they
otherwise further a charitable purpose. Each of these activities has the
potential to compete with for-profit organizations, and this competition
can produce inefficient behavior.236 If, for example, an exempt
organization operated a food stand for the convenience of its employees,
work, at least until the house is sold and gain is realized. This is true even though in
both cases the painting comes at the expense of a for-profit painting organization.
234. See supra Part V.B (discussing the inefficiencies stemming from exempt
competition with for-profit firms).
235. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(e) (as amended in 1983). The example of exempt
behavior is an orphanage’s retail store operated by volunteers. No mention is made of
what the retail store’s operations must be. An orphanage’s volunteer-operated sandwich
shop in an urban financial district would presumably be exempt under this
interpretation, despite the obvious competition with for-profit providers.
236. See supra Part V.B (discussing the inefficiencies resulting from exempt
competition with for-profit firms). Exemption of coops from pole rentals could be seen
as promoting efficient coop ownership, although if coops are the efficient ownership
form, perhaps federal subsidies would not be necessary. See generally HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 172 (1996) (observing that electric coops
emerged even before federal subsidies).
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such activity would presumably be exempt even if it displaced nearby
more efficient for-profit food providers.237 If these activities further
exempt purposes, however, then they would be exempt.
The final enumerated exemption, distribution of low-cost items
incidental to fundraising activities, should be changed into a general de
minimis exemption. Any combined UBIT activity generating less than a
specified amount of revenue would not be subjected to the UBIT,
because for these activities, the administrative costs associated with
UBIT compliance are most likely to outweigh efficiency gains. The de
minimis exception must be applied on an aggregate activity basis to
prevent organizations from avoiding it through a series of small
activities.
In summary, most of the statutorily-enumerated UBIT exemptions
should be eliminated. Of these changes, the exemption for capital gains
may be the most important. The exemption for other passive investment
income should be retained, and a general de minimis exemption should
be put into place that will better capture much of the small-level activity
at which the statutorily-enumerated exemptions seem targeted.
c. Related Activity
In contrast to the suggestions above to remove much of the UBIT
statutorily-enumerated exemptions, the relatedness exemption should
remain.238 While there are administrative costs with determining whether
237. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1983) (exempting an
educational institution’s bookstore’s sales of books or a hospital’s pharmacy sales to
patients, although the exemption is also couched in terms of intermittent sales); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-25-035 (Mar. 28, 2006) (recognizing convenience as a ground for
exemption independent of whether the activity is intermittent or regularly engaged in).
Of course, if there are other non-charitable reasons to promote these activities, the
nonprofit could always subsidize them, or even operate them at cost and incur no tax
liability.
238. But see Colombo, supra note 192, at 562-63 (advocating a general
“commercial activity” tax so that “all . . . profits, related or not, would be subject to
tax.”). Professor Hansmann also suggests eliminating the relatedness exemption in
certain circumstances. Hansmann, supra note 196, at 629-31 (suggesting that certain
related behavior that could be performed just as well by for-profit firms could be
subjected to the UBIT, saving administrative costs, as well as other costs associated
with having provision by subsidized nonprofits).
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an activity is related or not,239 there would also be administrative costs
with complying with the UBIT if the relatedness exemption were
eliminated. The cost associated with determining relatedness should
decrease as precedent continues to grow over time. Further, competitive
exempt organizations would respond to elimination of the relatedness
exemption with an increase in prices or a decrease in provision of the
related activity or the general charitable activity.240 These price increases
may be undesirable to the extent the activities are charitable in nature
and require subsidization to reach their optimal consumption.
This last statement raises an important point. Relatedness
exemptions should be given to only those activities that actually further
an exempt purpose through their connection with the exempt purpose,
and not to those activities with a slight relatedness resemblance but no
actual charitable relatedness. Nonprofits have the incentive to classify as
related as much activity as is possible to escape taxation,241 and steps
must be taken to minimize this.
Under the relatedness analysis, a museum’s parking lot revenues
from museum patrons should be treated as exempt. Practically, a
museum must offer a parking lot for visitors, and even though operating
a parking lot generally is not considered an exempt activity, when the
parking lot is connected to an exempt museum, its revenues from
museum customers should be exempt. On the other hand, it is more
debatable whether a hospital’s gift shop should be exempt. Hospitals do
not require gift shops for effective provision of care; many exempt
hospitals function perfectly well without gift shops. Although it has
been said that gift shops help charitable provision of care by promoting
patients’ well-being,242 it is debatable how much merit that statement
has, and in particular how much extra well-being, presumably in the

239.
240.

See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
This result might also be expected when eliminating any of the current UBIT
exemptions. However, the exemptions discussed above that are not charitable or related
to charitable purposes in their own right have no charitable component, so an increase
in their price or decrease in their provision should not pose significant problems. Any
social losses from price increases translated to the general charitable activities would
have a better chance of being more than offset by the efficiency gains.
241. See I.R.C. § 512(a) (2006).
242. Rev. Rul. 69-267, 1969-1 CB 160.
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form of extra gifts, a hospital-run shop provides over what visitors
would otherwise bring on their own.
For the relatedness exemption to continue (as well as for the
determination of what is a charitable activity), a facts-and-circumstances
test is required. Such a test necessarily imposes uncertainty, but unlike
today’s system the uncertainty and risk would be confined to the
possibly-related activity only. Under this reform, a determination that an
activity is unrelated would not in turn threaten exemption, and therefore
the parent nonprofit would not have reason to conduct the activity
within a subsidiary solely because it risked losing its entire exemption.
Finally, it is worth noting that despite the requisite facts-andcircumstances test with a relatedness exemption, such an exemption may
in some ways actually promote ease of administrability compared to the
alternatives. Without the relatedness concept, the exemption system may
run into difficult issues involving the level of granularity to apply to an
exempt activity when determining what portion of its revenue is exempt.
Consider again the exempt art museum. The art museum naturally
requires a security system to ensure that the art remains in the museum.
It is highly unlikely that under the current system the security system
would, on its own, be an exempt purpose. One might argue, therefore,
that the art museum should bifurcate its ticket revenue and pay UBIT on
the portion allocable to the security system’s added benefit to the
visitors.243 Much of this tax would be canceled out by the deduction for
business expenses.244 But what if the benefit from the security system
exceeded its tax cost for the year?245 Should this difference be taxable?
However, when the security system is seen as related to the art
museum’s charitable mission, the entire ticket sales could be treated as
exempt, and the costs associated with the above inquiry would be
avoided.

243. This idea would be consistent with the “fragmentation rule,” where exempt
organizations carrying out an activity that is only partially consistent with exempt
purposes must fragment the revenue into the portion consistent with exempt purposes
and the remainder. Only the portion consistent with exempt purposes is then exempt.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1983).
244. I.R.C. § 162(a).
245. This would be particularly likely once the system was fully depreciated.
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2. Relaxing Exemption Requirements
Once the UBIT has been modified to ensure it encompasses all
nonexempt activity, the requirements for obtaining exempt treatment
can be relaxed. The nonprofit organizational and operational
requirements should be broadened to encompass any nonprofit even if
only a portion of its goal is exempt.246 This portion could be
significantly smaller than the portion required by today’s organized and
operated exclusively for exempt purposes requirement. Only revenues
generated from activities that further charitable purposes would be
exempted from tax.
Policing nonexempt activity through the UBIT instead of the
exemption requirements avoids the problem of nonprofits inefficiently
choosing to conduct activities through for-profit subsidiaries instead of
directly, because the stakes at risk are significantly lower. It also allows
nonprofits to undertake any for-profit activities that they may be able to
perform more efficiently (after UBIT taxes) than a for-profit firm,
without risking their overall exemption. A classic example of such
activity is a university that leases its athletic fields for nonexempt
purposes, such as a fair. Because the university has already built the
fields to further its own exempt purposes, it would be efficient to allow
the university to take advantage of economies of scope and use the field
for nonexempt purposes as well. The university should not have to
worry that the revenues from the lease might threaten its exemption.
The UBIT exemption on dividends coupled with UBIT liability on
capital gains means a nonprofit would undertake these nonexempt
activities only when it can earn a rate of return that is higher than the
market rate of return on the same activity. In addition, because
nonprofits cannot distribute excess earnings,247 they may be particularly

246. This is a less restrictive requirement than the one proposed by Professor
Colombo. See Colombo, supra note 192, at 562-63 (suggesting granting a tax
exemption when a nonprofit conducts “any significant charitable activity”). In fact, as
long as nonexempt activity is taxed as UBIT, there is no reason to require the exempt
activity to be significant or, in fact, for there to be any exempt activity at all. In this
latter case, the “exempt” nonprofit would function merely as any nonexempt nonprofit,
with its income subjected to the UBIT instead of equivalent corporate income taxes.
247. See supra note 4.
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inclined to have funds available for these efficient for-profit activities.248
As shown in Figure 1, nonprofits’ undertaking of unrelated activities has
gradually decreased in recent years, perhaps out of fear of losing their
exemptions. Society will be better off if nonprofits were more free to
use retained earnings to engage in these activities without risking their
exemptions.

It should not matter whether the revenues from for-profit activities
are used to cross-subsidize an exempt activity or are instead used to
further the for-profit activities, or whether revenues from exempt
activities are used to further the exempt activities or are instead used for
for-profit purposes.249 If the exempt activities are worth undertaking,
they will be financed with retained earnings that may or may not include
earnings from for-profit activities. The tax exemption’s goal should be
to facilitate the initial provision of charitable goods and services. Once
these goods and services have been provided and the accompanying
revenues have been earned, it should not matter to what use the revenues
are devoted.

248. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text. This inability to distribute
excess earnings can be one of the worst sources of nonprofit inefficiency. See
HANSMANN, supra note 239, at 38. Restricting what can be done with these earnings,
such as limiting their use in for-profit activities, only worsens the inefficiency.
249. But see Colombo, supra note 88, at 689-91 (suggesting that for-profit activity
should be allowed only if its revenues are used to cross-subsidize exempt activity).
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Exemptions should also be granted to nonprofits that provide
services related to other organizations’ exempt purposes, whether the
other organization is the parent or an unrelated exempt organization.
Because these related activities would be exempt if conducted by the
parent or by another organization, they should also be treated as exempt
if conducted by any nonprofit organization, regardless of relation. This
arrangement ensures that parents will efficiently use nonprofit
subsidiaries (such as the case when the parent museum conducts parking
lot operations through a subsidiary), and it also allows for organizations
to take advantage of efficient economies of scale. For example, an
organization that owns and operates parking lots for several exempt
museums may be more efficient than if these parking lots were owned
and operated by the individual museums, perhaps due to efficiencies
from administrative expense streamlining. By the above analysis, but
not necessarily under current law, the nonprofit parking lot operator
should be allowed an exemption.250 As long as a desired subsidized
activity is provided,251 in this case parking at museums, we should not
care whether the revenues are received by the museum or by the parking
lot operator.252
Although the above discussion demonstrates several advantages to
broadening the UBIT and making exemptions easy to attain, there are

250. The parking lot operator also would not be allowed an exemption under the
alternative proposal put forth by Professor Colombo, which recommends expanding the
UBIT. His proposal would provide derivative exempt status to organizations that satisfy
I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) “supporting organizations” rules, which require the organizations to
be organized and operated exclusively to carry out the purposes of a charitable
organization. See Colombo, supra note 192, at 552. Instead, my proposal would provide
exemption for activities that would be exempt if conducted by the exempt nonprofit.
Essentially, it allows exempt nonprofits to outsource these activities to other nonprofits,
without the activities losing their exempt nature.
251. Competition among exempt parking lot operators will ensure that the parking is
provided where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and because the revenues are
exempt, the price for parking at exempt parking lots will be below the price for parking
at nonexempt parking lots, which is the result that the exemption seeks to obtain.
252. The non-distribution constraint and private inurement and benefit doctrines, of
course, keep the parking lot operator (as well as all nonprofit operators) from funneling
revenues out for his own personal use. See supra note 4; supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
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several aspects of this suggested reform that may raise some concern.
These concerns are considered in the following section.
3. Potential Concerns
Significantly relaxing the requirements for achieving exemption
raises a variety of concerns. Making exemptions easy to obtain may
increase the incentive for cheating the tax system, erode the tax base, or
devalue the “halo” effect that nonprofits possess.253 Further, allowing
unlimited nonexempt activity may increase nonprofit managerial
diversion. Finally, for-profit opportunities may open up the possibility
for inefficient empire building. Some of these concerns are more
pressing than others.
First, policymakers might worry that making exemptions easier to
obtain might make it more attractive for organizations to play the
exemption lottery; organizations could obtain exempt status and then
claim exemptions on nonexempt revenue, in hopes that they will not be
audited, or that the fraud will go undetected. Of course, such behavior
would be prohibited (as it already is in the current system). Nonetheless,
if the reform results in more organizations obtaining exemptions, as well
as more activity undertaken by exempt organizations, enforcement
would be more difficult. Furthermore, significant fines for violations
may prove problematic. Imposing fines could result in penalties to
organizations which are attempting to honestly conduct potentiallyexempt activity. This is similar to today’s system which threatens loss of
overall exemption. Although some deterrent to intentionally claiming
for-profit activities as exempt is necessary, it must not be too severe or
else the problems contained in the current system will be repeated.
However, the current system audits only a very small portion of all
exempt nonprofits. It has been estimated that it would take seventy-nine
years to audit all current nonprofits.254 Furthermore, most applications

253.
254.

See supra note 6.
JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 9 (2d ed., 2006) (quoting GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BOROWSKI,
FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT ECONOMY (1993)).
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for exemption are met with rubber-stamp approval,255 suggesting that the
suggested reform may not be significantly worse with the exemption
lottery problem than the current system. While more exempt nonprofits
with more activities would only exacerbate the problem, if the
probability of detection is already incredibly small, reducing it further
may not significantly affect activity. Essentially, the exemption lottery is
already almost a guaranteed win.
In either case, increased enforcement efforts are very likely a good
idea, and could potentially be supported by imposing an annual fee on
exempt organizations. This fee would also deter for-profits from using
the nonprofit form solely in an attempt to classify for-profit activities as
exempt. Imposing a penalty of a percentage of claimed-exempt activities
found to be nonexempt could provide additional deterrence. A balance
must be struck between deterrence, and promotion of efficient entity
form; increased deterrence raises the problem of increasing the stakes
that hinge upon the uncertain classification process. Greater IRS
vigilance could achieve the same result with lower deterrence, but the
vigilance incurs administrative costs.256
Such enforcement and deterrence efforts of course carry costs, but
they should be incurred even under the current system, whose infrequent
audits promote playing the exemption lottery. It is also encouraging that,
as shown by Figure 2,257 assessed UBIT as a percentage of gross UBIT
has increased while the UBIT tax rate has remained relatively stable,
suggesting that IRS vigilance may already be on the rise and resulting in
more compliance with classifying activities as subjected to the UBIT.
More vigilance certainly appears necessary, since Figure 3258 shows that
255. Id. An individual with knowledge about the exemption process noted that
“something like 95 or 99 percent who apply get approved. It’s like getting your driver’s
license.” Id.
256. In addition, as enforcement increases, so too does the amount of precedent and
guidance that helps organizations appropriately characterize their income, making it
less costly for them to make these decisions.
257. Data used for this Figure was taken from the IRS website. SOI Tax Stats –
Exempt Organizations’ Unrelated Business Income (UBI) Tax Statistics, IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/charitablestats/article/0,,id=97210,00.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2011).
258. Data used for this figure was taken from the IRS website. SOI Tax Stats –
Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov
/taxstats/charitablestats/article/0,,id=97210,00.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
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the proportion of nonprofits reporting negative or zero unrelated income
remains distressingly high. In particular, it is most unlikely that
nonprofits were accurately allocating expenses and charging appropriate
market rates in transactions with subsidiaries and parents if one-third of
nonprofits with unrelated activities produce neither positive nor negative
net income.

Policymakers may also worry that relaxing exemption requirements
will result in tax base erosion as organizations legitimately avoid
taxation. While this result is possible, it is not cause for concern. The
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expanded UBIT will tax all nonexempt activity, so that the only tax base
erosion will be comprised of activity that was already worthy of
exemption, but which was not being exempted. For instance, exempt
activity being conducted within a for-profit subsidiary to preserve the
parent’s exemption would be exempt under the proposed reform if
conducted by the exempt nonprofit parent. Thus, the only activity
removed from the tax base will be exempt activity that, for policy
reasons, should be exempt anyway.259 And if enforcement efforts
increase and the relatedness requirement is effectively policed, the tax
base may ultimately expand.
Of perhaps more concern is the fact that granting liberal
exemptions and permitting significant unrelated activity could devalue
the “halo” that accompanies the exempt nonprofit label. It is unclear
whether this effect would occur. On the one hand, if exempt nonprofits
come to be viewed merely as a form of profit maximizers, then their
halo may fade, leading consumers to patronize for-profit providers or
reduce donations.260 This result may not be all that undesirable if the
halo currently encourages consumers to choose an inefficient nonprofit
over a more efficient for-profit. Furthermore, even though dispersal of
the halo could reduce consumers’ perceived well-being, their financial
well-being will improve. On the other hand, the suggested reform would
not lead nonprofits to conduct their exempt activities any differently.
Thus, if consumers view some exempt nonprofit operations as “safer”261
before the reform, they should continue to see the exempt nonprofits as
“safer” after the reform, at least as applied to the exempt activities.
It is also worthwhile to observe that consumers of nonprofits,
whether the nonprofit is exempt or not, gain any benefits offered by the

259. Of course, if the exempt activity was already being conducted by the for-profit
subsidiary anyway, then one might argue that exempting it from taxation erodes the tax
base; the activity would still be provided but now treated as exempt. However,
exempting the activity should result in increased provision of the activity, either in
greater quantity by the now-exempt provider or by new providers whose marginal costs
just exceeded marginal revenues when not exempt. So even though the activity was
already being provided without an exemption, we would expect more provision with the
exemption.
260. As with the current system, donations would have to be used for charitable
purposes to be deductible by the donor.
261. See supra note 6.
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nonprofit’s binding commitment to its non-distribution constraint.262
Currently there are no significant restraints to keep nonprofits engaging
in for-profit behavior as long as they do not seek exempt status.263 Thus,
the dissipation of any desirable halo effect arises only to the extent that
consumers attach it to exempt nonprofits, rather than nonprofits in
general.
The problem with using exempt status as an indication of quality is
that exemptions then have several incompatible goals. Most notably, the
public goods theory of exemptions,264 that an exemption promotes
provision of desirable public goods, is unrelated to whether an
individual should use the exemption as a positive signal of quality.
Other theories of the nonprofit exemption are similarly incompatible
with the “halo” effect of exemptions.265 Perhaps a better solution would
be to focus exempt status on achieving these primary goals, while
allowing other specialized certification or organizational structures to
concentrate on sending a positive signal to consumers.266
Another topic of concern is that granting exempt nonprofits an
unfettered ability to conduct nonexempt activity may result in
undesirable managerial diversion. Managerial diversion refers to the
inefficiency that results when managers lose track of their charitable
mission because their attention is instead diverted by other activities, 267
which in this case are additional for-profit opportunities. This outcome
may be particularly undesirable if nonprofit managers are already
relatively inefficient because of the nature of the nonprofit structure.268
It is not clear whether managerial diversion will occur and, if it
does, it might be outweighed by countervailing benefits. For instance, it

262.
263.

See Hansmann, supra note 4.
Nonprofits are not necessarily exempt. The American Automobile Association
is one example of a nonexempt nonprofit engaging in for-profit activity. See supra note
5.
264. See supra Part I.A.
265. See Hansmann, supra note 182. Exemptions acting as a halo effect are
compatible with the donative theory of exemptions proposed by Mark Hall and John
Colombo, however. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 182.
266. B-corporations and low-profit limited liability companies are just two
promising alternatives to the nonprofit exemption for achieving this goal.
267. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 192, at 534.
268. See Hansmann, supra note 196, at 616-17.
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seems unlikely that a successful nonprofit manager would ignore the
nonprofit operations simply because for-profit opportunities are
available; indeed, nonprofit managers sometimes ignore profitable forprofit opportunities to focus on their nonprofit missions.269 Instead, he
might hire an additional manager if he finds his oversight is spread too
thin.
Further, it is likely that a for-profit activity would not be competing
for the manager’s attention unless it was as profitable as the exempt
activities. To the extent that managerial attention is shifted to more
efficiently-performed activities, society is better off.270 Of more concern
may be that additional for-profit activities may increase a firm’s
operations and require it to adopt a more bureaucratic structure,
increasing administrative and other costs. However, the exempt
nonprofit would not undertake these new activities unless their return
exceeded the market rate by at least this cost increase.
Finally, a policymaker might worry that allowing exempt
nonprofits to conduct unlimited nonexempt activity could provide an
easy avenue for empire building. The nonprofit manager may decide to
undertake inefficient, for-profit activities in an effort to expand the
nonprofit’s operations and build an “empire,” which provides
nonpecuniary utility to the manager.271 Empire building generally is not
as large a concern in the for-profit sector, because wayward
organizations should be corrected by competition or corporate
takeovers.272 The competitive check may not be as strong in the
nonprofit sector,273 and nonprofit corporate takeovers do not generally
occur.274

269.
270.
271.
272.

See, e.g., Weisbrod, supra note 202, at 47, 52-55.
See Colombo, supra note 192, at 535.
See supra note 30.
Since empire building reduces a company’s value relative to its potential, it
will either be outcompeted by other organizations without wasteful empire building
(and with cheaper costs) or purchased and run by management that can increase the
firm’s value by restricting wasteful projects.
273. Unlike for-profit firms, nonprofits can continue indefinitely while earning
enough just to break even. For-profit firms generally must earn sufficient profit to
provide a return on their equity.
274. Of course, because nonprofits do not have equity, many corporate takeovers in
the traditional sense are precluded. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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This unpleasant state of affairs warns of general nonprofit
inefficiency, a specific application of which is the potential for empire
building. Like general nonprofit inefficiency, however, empire building
is likely just as much a problem with the current system as it would be
with the suggested reform. Allowing nonprofits to conduct nonexempt
activity without risking their exemption provides more avenues for
empire building, but even under the current system nonprofits can
always engage in empire building with limited for-profit operations as
well as with unlimited exempt operations. It is unclear whether
additional for-profit avenues would result in more empire building or
instead merely in differences in how the empire building is conducted.
To the extent that more empire building could result, however, the
reform should be met with some caution in this regard.
While there are several potential concerns with relaxing exemption
standards and expanding UBIT coverage, only some of these concerns
are legitimately troublesome. It seems likely that the losses from these
potential inefficiencies would be outweighed by the efficiency gains
resulting from a system that does not threaten to impose huge sanctions
against exempt organizations conducting potentially nonexempt activity
directly.
With so much to be gained by reforming the interaction between
exemptions and UBIT, it is worth briefly considering why the IRS has
not already done so. Surely institutional inertia may provide some of the
explanation. The UBIT was enacted after exemptions had already
become the gatekeeper of the exemption process.275 Perhaps the IRS is
also concerned about the increase in manpower necessary to audit and
police a system with more for-profit activity carried out by exempt
nonprofits. As already mentioned, more IRS oversight is probably a
good idea even with the current system. And, while the penalty of losing
an entire exemption surely is a good deterrent, it over-deters by
promoting inefficient behavior, while at the same time invoking a
punishment wholly unrelated to the magnitude of the infraction. The
reforms suggested by this Article solve both these problems.

275. Recall that the UBIT was enacted after the exemption requirement scheme was
already in place. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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4. Exemptions for For-Profit Organizations?
Although the suggested reform would allow nonprofits to engage in
more nonexempt activity without losing their exemption, it does not
tackle the issue raised by other proposals that recommend an exemption
be offered to charitable activity performed by for-profit organizations.276
Consequently, my suggested reform leaves open the potential
inefficiency of nonprofits choosing to conduct charitable activity
through the nonprofit form when the for-profit form is more efficient.
This situation emerges because the charitable activity is exempt from tax
only when conducted by a nonprofit, not a for-profit.
Allowing for-profit exemptions would solve this inefficiency,277 but
it would be a considerably more difficult outcome to achieve politically.
And, even without the exemption, some organizations have found it
worthwhile to form for-profit charities.278 In addition, for-profit
exemptions have certainly not been free from criticism,279 and to the
extent that a tax exemption facilitates funding for nonprofits,280 which
cannot issue equity,281 the exemption would be unnecessary for forprofits. In any case, for-profit exemptions are beyond the scope of this
Article. It is worth noting, however, that while for-profit exemptions
276.
277.

See, e.g., Malani & Posner, supra note 182.
It would also be particularly attractive because it would allow exempt
nonprofits to efficiently outsource exempt activities to for-profit organizations that
could perform them cheaper. For example, with exemptions for for-profit organizations,
we would not require that the parking lot operator discussed in supra notes 47-48 be a
nonprofit to obtain a derivative exemption, so long as he undertook parking operations
for an exempt museum that would be free from UBIT if it operated its parking lot
directly. Allowing an exemption for for-profit operators would open up competition to
more organizations and ensure that exempt nonprofits did not waste resources on an
activity that could be performed more efficiently by another organization.
278. Google.org is a prominent example. Google.org conducts Google’s charitable
activities, but unlike most charitable organizations is a for-profit. See Katie Hafner,
Philanthropy Google’s Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at A1; About
Us, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/about.html (last visited May 25, 2011).
279. See, e.g., James. R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A
Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 (2010); David M. Schizer, Subsidizing
Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public
Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 254-55 (2009).
280. See Hansmann, supra note 182.
281. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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solve the problem of inefficiently choosing the nonprofit form for
exempt activities, they do not solve the problem of inefficiently
choosing the for-profit form for mixed or for-profit activities that is
motivated by today’s system of uncertainty and high stakes. Thus, a
system of for-profit exemptions should not be enacted without the
reform of nonprofit exemptions advocated by this Article.
CONCLUSION
The current IRS guidance on which activities are exempt and which
threaten exemptions, combines uncertainty with needlessly high stakes.
This incentivizes exempt organizations to make socially-inefficient
decisions in their choice of for-profit or nonprofit business form as well
as in their use of retained earnings. A reform that would relax exemption
requirements and tax all activity unrelated to charitable purposes, would
mitigate this problem while providing the requisite flexibility of the
current facts-and-circumstances tests.
Additionally, in the current environment of decreased governmental
support and reduced private donations, allowing nonprofits to undertake
for-profit activities without jeopardizing their exemption provides them
with much-needed alternative funding sources. Finally, with the muchpublicized state of the healthcare system, granting exempt hospitals the
freedom to undertake for-profit activities, including joint ventures, could
improve efficiencies through economies of scale and provide additional
revenue for cross-subsidization of other healthcare costs, granting relief
against the inexorable rise in healthcare costs. While the concepts of
private inurement and private benefit in the joint venture contexts still
need further development, ensuring that nonexempt activity does not
threaten exemptions is a necessary first step.
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Data for the total number of 501(c)(3) organizations is available
from the IRS at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/charitablestats
/article/0,,id=97176,00.html, and remaining data on the number of
501(c)(3) organizations with positive, neutral, and negative UBIT; gross
UBIT-taxable income; net UBIT-taxable income; and UBIT tax assessed
are available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/charitablestats/article/
0,,id=97210,00.html. Net UBI-taxable income is available only from
1997 to 2006, the last available year of data. The IRS calculates these
data based on samples of returns.
As noted in the Article, the amount of UBIT tax paid as a
percentage of gross UBIT has increased while the UBIT tax rate (both
effective and statutory) has remained relatively steady. Coinciding with
this observation, the proportion of 501(c)(3) organizations reporting
UBIT activities with net positive revenue has increased. However,
overall economic performance as measured by the S&P 500 has
fluctuated during this period of increase, suggesting that the increase is
not due entirely to an economy-wide increase in project profitability. An
alternative explanation is that the IRS has been pursuing UBIT income
more assiduously, leading more nonprofits to characterize income
appropriately and allocate costs correctly rather than disproportionately
to taxable activities. See Figure 4.
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Interestingly, the percent of exempt organizations with negative or
break-even net UBIT income remains very high. Vertically-integrated
exempt organizations have incentives to produce for-profit inputs at a
loss or the break-even point, which pushes profit downstream to the
final exempt good where they are not subjected to tax. The IRS has
expressed concern with shifting tax liabilities to lower-bracket
organizations,282 which should prohibit this type of behavior. It seems
that the deterrent is not yet sufficient, however, since it is hard to believe
that the majority of UBIT-applicable activities result in losses or no net
revenue.

282. The IRS requires that organizations allocate income and expenses so that they
“prevent the evasion of taxes or clearly . . . reflect the income of [the organizations].”
I.R.C. § 482 (1986). This section has been explicitly applied to exempt organizations.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(1) (as amended in 2009); see also I.R.C. § 1551 (preventing
corporations from transferring assets, solely for tax reasons, to related corporations with
lower marginal tax rates); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6902199500A (Feb. 19, 1969).
Additionally, costs shared between an exempt and for-profit organization must
be allocated based on fair market value and actual use, under penalty of exemption
revocation. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-08-047 (Dec. 4, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 86-26-102 (Apr. 7, 1986), modified, I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-45-064 (Aug. 13,
1986).
These restrictions combine to limit the flexibility that organizations should
have regarding input prices and allocation of costs and revenue among related entities.

